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DEMOCRATIC FREEDOM AND RELIGIOUS FAITH IN THE REFORMED TRADITION

Winthrop S. Hudson Divinity School, University of Chicago

During recent years there has been an interesting shift in the attitude of many historians with regard to the relationship of Calvinism to the development of democracy. A generation ago, the contention that modern democracy was a daughter of Calvinism was eminently respectable in academic circles. The fact that modern democracy arose and put down its strongest roots in lands most deeply influenced by the Reformed faith—in England, Scotland, Holland, America and Switzerland—was regarded as self-evident confirmation of this contention.

Within the present generation this thesis as to the relationship of Calvinism and democracy has been sharply challenged. The development of democracy in Calvinist countries is said to be an historical accident, and the forces which produced the democratic patterns of government are said to have been social and economic rather than religious. If ideological parentage is to be sought, it is asserted, it will be found in the essentially secular philosophies of the English Levellers and Deists rather than among the Calvinists. The Calvinists, far from fostering democratic ideas, resisted them. Their ideal was the aristocratic ideal expressed in the lines of Nathaniel Ward:

The upper world shall rule
While stars will run their race;
The nether world obey
While people keep their place.

The interest of the Calvinists was in the establishment of a theocracy governed by the elect, and their true sentiments are revealed in the words of such men as John Winthrop and John Cotton. "A democracy," said Winthrop, "is, among most civil nations, accounted the meanest and worst of all forms of government." "Democracy?" Cotton asked rhetorically. "I do not conceive that ever God did ordain it as a fit government either for church or commonwealth."

Marc-Edouard Chenevière is, perhaps, the best spokesman for the newer point of view. In La pensée politique de Calvin (1937), he points out that to regard Calvin as the spiritual parent of democracy, it is necessary to consider Beza, Hotman Mornay, William of Orange, Buchanan, Althusius, and Roger Williams as the true representatives of Calvinism. But, he continues, these men are not orthodox Calvinists, and to the extent that they defended liberal and democratic ideas they merely developed ideas arising before the Reformation in the "full" Middle Ages, and even these ideas were not democratic in the modern sense of the term. Furthermore, these men do not merit the title of Calvinist political theorists because they were far more preoccupied with meeting the immediate political needs of their coreligionists than with seeking, as did Calvin, to trace the fundamental principles of a political doctrine inspired by the Word of God. This is made clear, he asserts, when one notes that the infinite variations of the political doctrines of these men follow the needs of the moment and affect, not merely the application, but the fundamental principles of Calvin's thought. It is true, of course, that the Reformation indirectly favored the development of democratic ideas by the creation of religious minorities in a number of countries, but this fact scarcely makes the Reformers the spiritual parents of modern democracy.1

The central contention, then, is this: the Calvinists by creating religious minorities in certain countries prepared the way for democracy, but there was no rational basis for such a development in their thought. The inherent logic of their doctrines would not demand such a result, nor even make it possible without seriously compromising their principles. The development of democracy was at best an unintentional result. By throwing themselves into opposition to existing regimes, the Calvinists cultivated an atmosphere and a sentiment which was congenial to democratic ideas and actually stimulated their development, but the end they sought was not rule by the people. Indeed, they created a situation which made impossible the solution they desired—the aristocratic rule of the elect. Nor was the opposition to the existing regimes due primarily to inherent political principles in Calvinistic thought, but rather to the fact that the Reformed groups found themselves compelled to struggle for existence in a hostile environment. Forced to demand rights for themselves, they found it difficult and ultimately impossible to deny them to others.

This reconstruction contains large elements of truth but the overall conclusion is both false and misleading. Roland H. Bainton has said with reference to the development of religious freedom: "If Calvin ever wrote anything in favor of religious liberty it was a typographical error." To make a similar sweeping statement with regard to Calvin and democracy would be unjust and untrue. An examination of the literature of Calvinism, I believe, will disclose four basic propositions which should govern our thinking in this area.

1. It is a mistake to identify Calvinism with a small group of New England oligarchs as if they were representative of the movement as a whole. Not only is this to ignore Ponet, Goodman, Knox, Beza, Hotman, Mornay, William of Orange, Althusius, and a good many others who certainly stood in the Reformed tradition; it is to substitute what became a minor current for the major stream.

2. It is a mistake to regard Calvinism as a static body of political dogma. The contribution of Calvinism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cannot be measured by what Calvin said in 1536. A movement can never be identified with a certain body of rigid and unchanging principles, for that would be to deny the historical process itself. A movement can only be described and identified in terms of a continuity which maintains a degree of inner consistency. We can trace considerable change in Calvin's thought from 1536 to 1559, and yet in that development Calvin did not involve himself in any fundamental contradictions.

3. The thought of Calvin provided the potential basis for the elaboration of democratic ideas.³ Not only did he provide a basis for resistance to the exercise of arbitrary power, but his thought did not preclude the formulation of a definitely democratic philosophy of government. The assumption that the Calvinist ideal involved, of necessity, government by the elect is simply a fiction.

4. These democratic ideas were in fact elaborated by Calvinists.

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Basic to any real understanding of the influence of Calvinism in the development of democracy is the recognition of Cal-

² Concerning Heretics (1935), 74.

³ We should not discount the importance of a hostile environment. The necessity for resistance usually evokes a philosophy of resistance, as was demonstrated at Magdeburg in 1550 when the Lutherans of that city resisted the imposition of the Interim. The important point is that some groups are rendered somewhat impotent because of the absence within their own tradition of any clear-cut basis upon which they can erect a philosophy of resistance. Confusion, bewilderment, and uncertainty are the result. In Calvinism however, the basis and even the obligation of resistance was clearly apparent. It was inherent in Calvinistic thought.

vin's active and profound interest in politics. "Calvinism," declares V. H. Rutgers, "has never manifested indifference with regard to the state." On the contrary, Calvinism has always regarded the state as a positive good, and politics as a legitimate and even an obligatory concern of the religious man.

Calvin explicitly rejected the concept prevalent in some Protestant circles that since the world is evil, one must refrain from participation in the activities of the world, which meant specifically that one must refrain from participation in the activities of government. With equal definiteness, Calvin rejected the view that the state was a mere concession to sin which must be tolerated and in the activities of which one must participate only as a citizen and not as a Christian. Civil government, he affirmed, is not "a polluted thing, which has nothing to do with Christian men" (Institutes, IV, xx, 2). It is a "benevolent provision" of God through which he effects his purposes. It is not simply a remedy for evil, a restraint for sin, a consequence of the fall; it is a positive good. Government makes possible the right ordering of life which is necessary to all communal living,5 and "is equally as necessary to mankind as bread and water. light and air, and far more excellent." For it enables men "to secure the accomodations arising from all these things" and "enables them to live together" (*Institutes*, IV, xx, 3). An even more important end of government, however, is to glorify God by creating a holy community. The state is an instrument in the hands of God by which he effects his will. Politics, therefore, is the concern of the Christian as a Christian, and not simply as a citizen in an evil world. The will of God is supreme and must be obeyed not merely in the individual life but in the collective life as well. The community must be Christianized and the world brought into harmony with the divine will.

At this point we become involved in one of the apparent paradoxes of Calvinist thought. Calvin pictured God "not as idly beholding from heaven the transactions which happened in the world, but as holding the helm of the universe and regulating

4 "Le Calvinisme et l'état Chrétien," Études sur Calvin et le Calvinisme (1935), 151.

^{5 &}quot;Civil government is designed, as long as we live in this world, to cherish and support the external worship of God, to preserve the pure doctrine of religion, to defend the constitution of the Church, to regulate our lives in a manner requisite for the society of men to form our manners to civil justice, to promote our concord with each other, and to establish peace and tranquility." (Institutes, IV, xx, 2).

all events," even the most minute. And yet Calvin constantly emphasized the duties and obligations of men to effect God's will in the world. With regard to political matters, on the one hand, it is God, irrespective of human desires and efforts, who effects his will through the state; on the other hand, it is the duty of those who are involved in the affairs of state to effect the purposes of God. The paradox, of course, is more apparent than real, and can best be resolved by letting Calvin speak for himself.

He who has fixed the limits of our life, has also intrusted us with the care of it; has furnished us with means and supplies for its preservation; has also made us provident of dangers; and, that they may not oppress us unawares, has furnished us with cautions and remedies. Now, it is evident what is our duty. If God has committed to us the preservation of our life, we should preserve it; if he offers supplies, we should use them; if he forewarns us of dangers, we should not rashly run into them; if he furnishes remedies, we ought not to neglect them. But it will be objected, no danger can hurt, unless it has been ordained that it shall hurt us, and then no remedies can avert it. But what if dangers are therefore not fatal, because God has assigned you remedies to repulse and overcome them?... You conclude that it is unnecessary to guard against danger because, if it be not fatal, we shall escape it without caution; but, on the contrary, the Lord enjoins you to use caution, because he intends it not to be fatal to you ... The arts of deliberation and caution in men proceed from the inspiration of God, and . . . subserve the designs of his providence in the preservation of their lives; as, on the contrary, by neglect and slothfulness, they procure to themselves the evils which he has appointed for them . . . It has pleased God to conceal from us all future events, that we may meet them as doubtful contingencies, and not cease to oppose to them the remedies with which we are provided, till they shall have been surmounted, or shall have overcome all our diligence (Insti., I. xvii, 4).

The effect of Calvinistic thinking, therefore, was not to lessen the sense of individual responsibility, but actually to increase it. The political order was of concern to the Christian man, and he was expected to shape it into a holy commonwealth with whatever means God had provided.

II.

In assessing the influence of Calvinism in the development of modern democracy, we must give our attention, first of all, to the twin pillars upon which democracy rests: (1) the idea of limited sovereignty, of a government under law, of limits beyond which government cannot go and to which it must conform; (2) the right of resistance when these limits are exceeded. These

⁶ Institutes, I, xvi, 4.

two concepts do not constitute the length and breadth of democracy, but they are the foundation stones upon which democracy rests. Nowhere have they been more clearly stated than in the American Declaration of Independence.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, . . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it . . . Prudence, indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes . . . But when a long train of abuses and usurpations . . . evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.

Calvin's fundamental postulate was the absolute sovereignty of God, and in the realm of politics that meant that God was the "King of kings" to whose will the desires of earthly princes must be subject, to whose decrees their commands must yield, to whose majesty their sceptres must submit (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 32). As the vice-gerents of God, princes were obliged to "exhibit to men an image, as it were, of the providence, care, goodness, benevolence, and justice of God" (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 6). Magistrates, therefore, are limited in the exercise of their power by the superior authority of God, and their rule must ever be in subjection to the precepts of natural la was made manifest in the Scriptures. "The written law (of Scripture)," Calvin said, "is just an attestation of the law of nature, through means of which God recalls to our memory that which he has previously engraved on our hearts" (*Comm. on Psalms* 119:52).

Within the Scriptures, Calvin distinguishes between ceremonial, judicial, and moral law. The first two have no abiding authority. They are variable, apply only to a specific time and place, and find their validation solely as they conform to the dictates of the moral law which is eternal and forever binding.

The moral law is comprised in two leading articles, of which one simply commands us to worship God with pure faith and piety, and the other enjoins us to embrace men with sincere love,—this law, I say, is the true and eternal rule of righteousness, prescribed to men of all ages and nations, who wish to conform their lives to the will of God. For this is his eter-

^{7 &}quot;The moral law is no other than a declaration of natural law, and of that conscience which has been engraven by God on the minds of men. The whole rule of this equity, of which we now speak, is prescribed in it" (Inst., IV, xx, 16).

nal and immutable will, that he himself be worshipped by us all, and that we mutually love one another . . . These judicial regulations, though they had no other end than the preservation of that love, which is enjoined in the eternal law of God, yet had something which distinguished them from that precept itself. As the ceremonies, therefore, might be abrogated with out any violation or injury of piety, so the precepts and duties of love remain of perpetual obligation, notwithstanding the abolition of all these judicial ordinances . . . All nations are left at liberty to enact such laws as they shall find to be respectively expedient for them; provided they be framed according to that perpetual rule of love (Insti., IV, xx, 15).

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The moral law is not a mere arbitrary divine requirement. Its purpose, among other things, is to secure the well being of mankind, and the purpose of government is to make it effective in the world. The vocation of magistrates, therefore, is "not to rule for their own interest, but for the public good." Magistrates are "ordained by God for the well being of mankind." Consequently, they are not "endued with unbridled power, but what is restricted to the well being of their subjects, in short they are responsible to God and to men in the exercise of their power" (Comm. on Romans 13:3-4).8

It is the moral law, then, which serves as a "bridle" to the governing power, and Calvin suggests that the judicial law which implements it should be reduced to writing so that "recourse may be had to the written law" and "the mutual obligation of head and members" may be apparent to all. Especially to be preferred is a covenant or compact, such as a coronation oath, by which

"kings and princes pledge their faith to the people."9

The idea that magistrates were limited and bound by the requirements of natural law was not a novel idea in the sixteenth century. It had been axiomatic throughout the period of the Middle Ages, but two novel elements were introduced into the general orthodox political thought of the period by the Protestant Reformers. The first was a general Protestant contribution which involved the affirmation of the competence of the individual to judge for himself when a ruler was subverting the ends for which he had been ordained and had become a tyrant. The second was more definitely a contribution of Reformed thought and involved the elaboration of constitutional means by which the people might resist the encroachments of tyranny.

Ernest Barker has asserted that "St. Thomas Aquinas-

⁸ Among the rights protected by natural law, according to Calvin, was the right of "every person" to "enjoy his property without molestation" (Insti., IV, xx, 3).

⁹ Herbert D. Foster, Collected Papers (1929), 81-82.

like the clerical thinkers of the Middle Ages in general—is a Whig: he believes in popular sovereignty, popular institution of monarchy, a pact between king and people, and the general tenets of Locke."10 Barker fails to mention, however, that between the king and the people stood the church, and that it was the church which determined when the rights of the people had been subverted. It was the responsibility of the pope "to judge and punish Emperors or Kings, to receive complaints against them. to shield nations from their tyranny, and to discharge their subjects from the oath of fealty." Unfortunately the church did not prove to be a very efficient guardian of the liberties of the people. It was unable to bring to a halt the progressive concentration of power that was taking place throughout Europe. and it failed to prevent the emergence of authoritarian regimes. The national states, perhaps, had become too strong to be easily amenable to ecclesiastical censure, and the church was beset by the perennial temptation of an institution to arrive at a modus vivendi with competing authorities in order to preserve its own institutional prerogatives and privileges. In any event the church as an institution did not fulfill its role as the protector of the people against the abuse of civil power.

A principal effect of the Reformation was to make the people once again the judges of their own liberties under God. By denying the authority of the Roman church, the possibility of an appeal to Rome as a defense against tyranny was eliminated; and by emphasizing the right of individual judgment, a foundation was laid for an appeal to the people.12 The Bible, of course, was

^{10 &}quot;Medieval Political Thought," The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Middle Ages, ed. F. J. C. Hearnshaw (1923), 21-22.

11 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Ages, Trans. F. W. Maitland

^{(1900), 15.}

¹² A characteristic Protestant statement as to the necessity of private judgment is to be found in a sermon by John Ponet, who was at the time chaplain to Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury. "It is not enoge," he said, "for yow to say that ye believe as the churche of the electes and chosen of god both believe, oneles ve know and feele in your hertes that thynge it is that the churche beleveth . . . Beleve not the doctryne because I or anye other preacher doth preache it unto you: but beleve it to be true: because your own fayth doth assuer you it to be true'' (A Notable Sermon (1550), no pagination). The obvious deduction and application in the realm of politics was made by Ponet in his Shorte Treatise of Politique Power (1556): "It is not the mannes warraunt that can discharge thee, but it is the thing it self that must justifie thee . . . before the throne of the highest . . . And therfore christen men ought well to consider, and weighe mennes commaundmentes before they be hastie to doo them, to see if they be contrarie or repugnaunt to Goddes commaundmentes and justice: which if they be, they are cruell and evill, and ought not to be obeyed" (Facsimile reproduction in Hudson, John Ponet (1942), 53).

the supreme touchstone by which the conduct of a ruler was to be tried, and the practical consequence of the Reformation was to place the interpretation of the Bible in the hands of the individual believer.¹³

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This incipient basis for resistance was not elaborated in Lutheranism for two reasons: (1) the issue was not raised in any acute form due to the generally favorable circumstances in which Lutheranism arose; (2) Lutheranism manifested little interest in the temporal affairs of the world. From Luther's point of view, not too much could or should be expected of earthly rulers. All men, to a greater or lesser degree, are slaves to sin and the temporal life is, therefore, destined to be an evil estate. The most that can reasonably be required of the governing power is that it should restrain men from the more flagrant and socially dangerous outcomes of their evil desires, and that the liberty of the church to proclaim the gospel should be preserved and protected.

Calvin, on the other hand, was deeply concerned with political arrangements and was convinced that the state had a positive role to play. The very "image of God ought to be conspicuous in a magistrate" (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 24), and it was his duty not simply to restrain men from the more flagrant sins, but actually his duty embraced the creation of a holy commonwealth. In Calvinism, then, the magistrate was subjected to a much more extensive, inclusive and rigid standard of judgment. Much more was to be expected of him.

While the individual might clearly judge as to whether or not a ruler was a tyrant, it was not necessarily the vocation of every individual to resist tyranny. Magistrates are ordained by God and as such are entitled to honor and obedience. "It is impossible," said Calvin, "to resist the magistrate without, at the same time, resisting God himself" (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 23), and this is true even of the worst of magistrates. The "authority of magistrates . . . is entitled to the greatest veneration. . . . , even though it reside in those who are most unworthy of it, and who, as far as in them lies, pollute it by their iniquity" (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 31).

¹³ Theoretically, since the Reformers felt the meaning of Scripture to be self-evident, there was no conflict in their minds between the right of individual interpretation and the responsibility of the church to validate the correct interpretation. Actually, of course, the right of individual interpretation was to destroy the effectiveness of corporate control.

A man of the worst character, and most undeserving of all honour. who holds the sovereign power, really possesses that eminent and divine authority, which the Lord has given by his word to the ministers of his justice and judgment; and, therefore, . . . he ought to be regarded by his subjects, as far as pertains to public obedience, with the same reverence and esteem which they would show to the best of kings (Insti., IV, xx, 25).14

Quite obviously, it is not within the province of a private person to seek to remedy the evils of tyranny (Insti., IV, xx, 29). "Private persons ought . . . not, without being called upon, (to) intermeddle with affairs of state, or rashly intrude themselves into the office of magistrates, or undertake anything of a public nature" (Insti., IV, xx, 31). A private person's only recourse is "to implore the aid of the Lord, in whose hand are the hearts of kings and the revolutions of kingdoms" (Insti., IV, xx, 31). and who will untimately break the sceptres of insolent kings and overthrow tyrannical governments.15

Calvin's counsel of unlimited and unqualified obedience is rather deceptive and provides G. P. Gooch with the basis for his charge that Calvin indulged in political double-talk.16 Calvin does seem to be advocating absolute and unconditional submission to authority, regardless of its character. In a pure monarchy this would be true, for in a pure monarchy the king alone possesses a public vocation. But not only did Calvin consider a

14 "In the obedience . . . due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception, . . . —that it do not seduce us from obedience to him, to whose will the desires of kings ought to be subject . . . How preposterous it would be for us, with a view to satisfy men, to incur the displeasure of him on whose account we yield obedience to men . . . If they command anything against him, it ought not to have the least attention; nor, in this case, ought we to pay any regard to all that dignity attached to magistrates," (Insti., IV, xx, 32). In making this exception, Calvin, of course, is not justifying resistance, but merely passive disobedience.

15 God effects the overthrow of tyrants in various ways, sometimes by "providential saviours." On occasion, says Calvin, God "raises up his servants as public avengers, and arms them with his commission to punish unrighteous domination, and to deliver from their distressing calamities a people who have been unjustly oppressed . . . When they are called forth to the performance of such acts by a legitimate commission from God, in taking arms against kings, (they) were not chargeable with the least violation of that majesty with which kings are invested by the ordination of God; but, being armed with authority from heaven, they punished an inferior power by a superior one" (Insti., IV, xx, 30). On this basis, some of Calvin's contemporary interpreters justified tyrannicide even by a "private person," if he had "some special inwarde commandment or surely proved motion of God." (E.g., John Ponet in his Shorte Treatise of Politike Power (1556), facsimile reproduction in Hudson, op. cit., 112.)

16 "We shall only read him aright if we figure to ourselves the proclamation of the duty of submission by a herald in the market-place, and the whispering of the right of resistance in the by-lanes of the city'' (English Democratic Ideas in

the Seventeenth Century (1927), 6).

pure monarchy undesirable, he was quite certain that no such form of government existed in Europe. Consequently, the discussion of rights and duties and obligations under a monarchy was academic and irrelevant. The governments of Europe were mixed governments and they provided certain constitutional means of resistance. The passage in which this is stated is crucial and should be quoted in full.

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Although the Lord takes vengeance on unbridled domination, let us not therefore suppose that that vengeance has been committed to us, to whom no command has been given but to obey and suffer. I speak only of private men. For when popular magistrates have been appointed to curb the tyranny of kings (as the Ephori, who were opposed to kings among the Spartans, or Tribunes of the people to consuls among the Romans, or Demarchs to the senate among the Athenians; and perhaps there is something similar to this in the power exercised in each kingdom by the three orders, when they hold their primary diets), so far am I from forbidding these officially to check the undue license of kings, that if they connive at kings when they tyrannise and insult over the humbler of the people, I affirm that their dissimulation is not free from nefarious perfidy, because they fraudulently betray the liberty of the people, while knowing that, by the ordinance of God, they are its appointed guardians (Insti., IV, xx, 31). Those who have been "appointed guardians" of "the liberty of the people," Calvin says, not only may but must resist and oppose the encroachments of tyranny. 17

Calvin felt that the best government was a mixture of aristocracy and democracy, such as prevailed in Geneva, where the "people" have a public vocation, and where the people "act in perfect consistence with their duty" when "they exert their strenuous and constant efforts for its preservation" (*Insti.*, IV, xx, 8). Some governments, however, were a mixture of monarchy and aristocracy, and in them a public vocation was con-

fined to the inferior magistrates. In such a state the people are not "to take the business into their own hands" when something in the "public administration" requires correction. "I mean," Calvin continues, "that they ought to attempt nothing without being commanded; for when they have the command of a governor, then they also are invested with public authority"

¹⁷ The inferior magistrates "ought to apply their greatest diligence, that they suffer not the liberty, of which they are constituted guardians, to be in any respect diminished, much less to be violated: if they are inactive and unconcerned about this, they are perfidious to their office, and traitors to their country" (Insti., IV, xx, 8).

¹⁸ Some of the governments, England for example, were considered by the leading theorists to be a mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

(*Insti.*, IV, xx, 23). That is to say, the people, even in a state where they have no public vocation, may take action to correct abuses of power under the leadership of the inferior magistrates.

Calvin did not define the role of the inferior magistrates, nor did he describe the manner in which they were to exercise their vocation as guardians of the liberties of the realm, but his disciples did. The author of the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos* (probably Mornay), for example, suggests that resistance to tyrants "by practice" belongs to the representatives of the people, to the "dukes, marquesses, earls, consuls, mayors, sheriffs, etc." These men "may, according to right, expel and drive tyranny and tyrants from their cities, confines, and governments." All of them ought to resist, but if not all then some, and if not some then one. And when one of them has raised the standard of resistance, even if he be only the most minor officer of the realm, then the people may rightfully join with him in overthrowing the tyrant.¹⁰

Men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were well aware of the anti-absolutist temper of Calvinist thinking, and they had no doubts as to the source of what some of them called the rebellious and seditious notions of the time. Richard Bancroft, chaplain to Elizabeth's archbishop of Canterbury and soon to be archbishop himself, pointed an accusing finger at Geneva and documented the charge in his book, *Dangerous Positions and Proceedings* (1593). James I echoed the accusation at the Hampton Court Conference, and after the Restoration, in 1663, Robert South repeated the charge. "In our account of the sons of Geneva," he said, "we will begin with the father of the faithful; faithful, I mean, to their old antimonarchical doctrines and assertions; that is, the great mufti of Geneva" —John Calvin.

III.

The concepts of limited sovereignty and the right of resistance may be the necessary foundation stones for the erection of a democratic philosophy, but taken by themselves they scarcely can be regarded as constituting a democratic philosophy. Calvinism, to be sure, did ultimately come to terms with democratic

A Defense of Liberty against Tyrants: A Translation of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos, ed., H. J. Laski (1924), 191, 213.
 Sermons (1856 ed.), I, 470.

thought and actually fostered its development, but there are two crucial questions in estimating the influence of Calvinism in this development. (1) Were these tendencies toward democracy present in Calvin's own thinking? (2) Did their fulfilment involve Calvinism in any fundamental contradictions with reference to its basic theological structure?

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Theoretically Calvin was indifferent to the three classically defined forms of government—monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. A godly commonwealth could exist under any of the three forms, and all three could easily be perverted. "The transition," he said, "is easy from monarchy to despotism; it is not much more difficult from aristocracy to obligarchy; but it is most easy of all from democracy to sedition" (*Insti.*, IV, xx. 8).

Monarchy, which he defined as "the dominion of one person, whether called a king, or a duke, or any other title," Calvin utterly misliked. "It very rarely happens," he observed, "that kings regulate themselves so that their will is never at variance with justice and rectitude," nor are they "endued with such penetration and prudence, as in all cases to discover what is best" (Insti., IV, xx, 8). A monarchy possesses no provision for restraining the arrogance and ambition of the king, and this to Calvin was its major defect. Few Calvinists, however, were ever willing to admit that a pure monarchy existed, and many of them, following the logic of Calvin's thought, insisted that one could not exist. It was inconceivable to them that, on the basis of natural (or moral) law, God could ordain or the people could consent to a government which made no provision for bridling the rapacity of a would be tyrant.²¹

²¹ More or less typical is the conclusion which Ponet draws from the premise that princes are ordained "to procure the wealthe and benefite of their subjectes, and not to work their hurt or undoing." In the light of this, he asserts that "indifferent expounders of the laws" have concluded that "neither pope, Emperor, nor king may doo any thing to the hurt of his people without their consent" (op. cit., pp. 26-27). In the last edition of the Institutes, Calvin himself suggests that there may be certain limits beyond which a tyrant cannot go without abrogating his power entirely and thus making it possible for any subject rightfully to resist him. He cites as an illustration, Darius, the king of Babylon, who "had exceeded his limits and not only been injurious to men, but by raising his horn against God, had virtually abrogated his own power" (Insti. IV, xx, 32). Two years later, Calvin had clarified his thought still further. Commenting on Daniel 6:22, he wrote: "Earthly princes lay aside all their power when they rise up against God, and are unworthy to be reckoned in the number of mankind. We ought rather to spit on their heads than to obey them when they are so restive and wish to rob God of his rights" (Corpus Reformatorum, LXIX, 25f).

Calvin's convictions as to what constituted the most desirable form of government underwent progressive change during the years. In the first edition of the *Institutes*, written before his arrival in Geneva, aristocracy had his preference. After seven years experience in the Swiss city, he favored "either aristocracy or a mixture of aristocracy and democracy" such as was practiced in Geneva. Sixteen years later, in the 1559 edition of the Institutes, he stresses the fact that it is "safer and more tolerable for the government to be in the hands of many, that they may afford each other mutual assistance and admonition, and that if any one arrogate to himself more than is right. the many may act as censors and masters to restrain his ambition." "No kind of government is more happy than this . . ., and I consider those as the most happy people, who are permitted to enjoy such a condition," in which they have the right and duty to "exert their strenuous and constant efforts" to preserve their liberties.22

This "mixture of aristocracy and democracy" was, of course, the form of government advocated by the leaders of the American Revolution,23 and it was this form of government which was adopted in the Constitution of 1789. Instead of a "mixed state," we now call it a representative democracy, but it possesses all the features of a mixture of aristocracy and democracy. The judges, guardians of the liberties of the people, are appointed for life. The executive originally was intended to be (and still is theoretically) chosen by a council of the "wisest heads" of the nation, and he in turn, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the chief officers of the state. The legislative power does not rest with the people but is exercised by a bi-cameral body, the upper portion of which was originally not elected by a direct vote of the people. No provision has yet been made for popular initative and referendum. And, finally, both the executive and the legislators are elected for definite terms and are not subject to recall. In the post-Revolutionary period, Hamilton laid more stress on the aristocratic element in the federal

²² Institutes, IV, xx, 8. A parallel statement of Calvin's mature views is to be found in his Commentaries on Micah: "In this especially consists the best condition of the people, when they can choose, by common consent, their own shepherds; for when any one by force usurps the supreme power, it is tyranny, and when men become kings by hereditary right, it seems not consistent with liberty" (Comm. on Micah 5:5).

²³ Charles E. Merriam (A History of American Political Theories (1928), 69) points out that James Otis, John and Samuel Adams were among those who explicitly approved the concept of a mixed state.

government, while Jefferson emphasized the democratic element, but neither denied its essential mixed character. Even the term "democratic republican," which Jefferson adopted as his party label, was an affirmation of the "mixed state" ideal. John Adams, who certainly ought to have known what was in the minds of the early leaders, explicitly acknowledged the debt which the "founding fathers" owed to Calvin and the political theorists of Calvinism.

The major obstacle to a frank recognition of this debt is the fact that the Calvinist theological system, to many modern interpreters, seems antithetical to a democratic philosophy of government. The acceptance of democracy by a Calvinist seems to involve Calvinism in at least two fundamental contradictions.

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One of these apparent contradictions is the major burden of Marc-Edouard Chenevière's La Pensée Politique de Calvin (1937). He states his contention in these words:

Calvin was a determined adversary of modern democracy, that is to say of the political doctrine which makes the people the only legitimate and possible holder of power and sovereignty. For Calvin, God is the sole sovereign; to God alone belongs the power; he is able to delegate it to whom he wishes, to one man as well as to several men or to all the people together, depending upon the circumstances and the political maturity of each people. But in no case does Calvin admit that the people are the sovereign from which emanates all power. The people are one of the instruments which God is able to use in order to organize political life in a given country, but they are nothing more (10).

How could Calvin speak of the sovereignty of the people, when he believed only in the sovereignty of God and recognized in the world only the powers delegated by God? For him, the people are only one instrument among others, to which God had given some powers, but to which power in general did not belong. (325).²⁴

The major current of Calvinism, beginning with Ponet, Goodman, Hotman, Mornay, and other contemporaries of Calvin, solved this problem in the same way in which many earlier

²⁴ Chenevière suggests, in this connection, that the people are simply actors on the political stage; "they are neither the director of the theater nor the author of the play" (325). If he is serious in pressing this point, he makes the whole discussion of monarchy and democracy as alternative forms of government irrelevant, for kings no less than the general populace are regarded by Calvin as puppets in the hands of the Almighty. Even the discussion of Calvin's emphasis on obedience, which occupies a large portion of Chenevière's book, is to no useful purpose, for it is God who determines whether or not they actually will obey. The decision is actually beyond their power. What Chenevière forgets is that God works through the people by making available to them means, and instruments, and "cantions," and that they are to act as if the decision were not beyond their power. The important point, so far as the development of political life is concerned, is that the people were not to regard themselves as puppets.

political theorists had solved it.25 They assumed that God delegated his powers to the people before delegating them to the magistrates, and that, therefore, the people were in a position superior to that of the magistrate. Although the power was derived from God, the people were given the determining voice as to the manner in which the power should be exercised—that is to say, ultimate sovereignty may reside in God but it is mediated through the people. The actual powers of government, qualified, to be sure, by divine requirements, rest upon the consent of the governed. This type of thinking would have been congenial to the mature Calvin, and Christopher Goodman stated that it had his specific approval. Calvin, he said, thought that the propositions contained in his Superior Powers (1559) were "somewhat harsh" with regard to the reigning monarchs and should, therefore, be "handled with caution," but "he nevertheless admitted them to be true."26

There is a sense, however, even in modern democratic thought, in which we may affirm the sovereignty of God above that of the people. To the extent that we believe that there are certain unalienable rights, belonging to all people everywhere, which cannot be abridged or destroyed by the democratic process, there is an area in which God is sovereign over and beyond any action of the people.

Chenevière feels that an attempt to reconcile democratic theory with a conception of the sovereignty of God involves a second difficulty. The magistrate, he says, as the representative of God cannot be the representative of the people.²⁷ Once again, this is to create a problem that did not exist in the mind of Calvin. As the representative of God the magis-

²⁵ It is beside the point to note that the doctrines associated with the developing political ideas of Calvinism were advocated by political theorists in the Middle Ages, and thus to discount the contribution of Calvinism in advocating these doctrines. What does this prove? Many of these ideas may be traced back to Cicero, and from Cicero to Plato, but before any idea becomes effective and influential in the world it must be espoused by a powerful and dynamic movement which is actually shaping the future. This was the contribution of Calvinism.

actually shaping the future. This was the contribution of Calvinism.

26 Original Letters Relative to the English Reformation, II, 771. For a discussion of Calvin's attitude toward the political ideas of Knox and Goodman, see Hudson, op. cit., 192-93.

^{27 &}quot;The fact that, for Calvin, the magistrate is the vicar of God on earth absolutely prevents us from considering him as a representative of the people bound to them by an oath" (324). "The magistrate is responsible for his conduct not to the people but only to God, since it is God who has fixed the limits of his power" 324-25). The inferior magistrates, "although constituted for the defense of the people, are not the representatives of the people. As with all magistrates, their authority comes from God and not from the people." (335).

trate is the representative of the people. The interests of God and the people are not separate but parallel. It is the divine intention that magistrates shall devote themselves to the public good and shall be restricted in their activities to the well being of their subjects. "They are," therefore, "responsible to God and to men in the exercise of their power" (Comm. on Romans 13:3-4).

What has troubled modern interpreters of the political aspect of Calvinism more than anything else, however, has been the assumption that the theocratic character of the Calvinist ideal necessitates government by the elect. This they find difficult to reconcile with government by the people. Consequently they find it impossible to conceive of Calvinism coming to terms with democracy without doing violence to the Calvinist ideal itself. The dilemma, fortunately, is more apparent than real, for the assumption that government by the elect is inherent in the Calvinist ideal is false.

It is to misunderstand Calvinism completely to think that God is limited to the saints as instruments through which he accomplishes his ends in the world. The reprobate are equally servants of his will. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between the doctrine of special grace and the doctrine of common grace, between the spirit of sanctification which believers alone possess and the operation of the spirit in all creatures. God has not abandoned his creation to the destructive effects of sin. He is ever intervening by common grace or providence to save the creation and to effect his purposes in the world. It is this concept of common grace which provides a foundation for a democratic philosophy. Woodrow Wilson provides a perfect illustration of the synthesis of Calvinist theology and democratic ideology. He was a staunch Calvinist and a sturdy democrat, and the cement which bound together these two facets of his life was his faith in the common grace of God. It was by virtue of this faith that he was able, without compromising his democratic convictions, to assert on Armistice Day 1923: "I am not one of those that have the least anxiety about the triumph of the principles I have stood for. I have seen fools resist Providence before and I have seen their destruction, as will come upon these again—utter destruction and contempt. That we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns."

IV.

To contend that early Calvinism anticipated and elaborated all the elements of modern democracy would be utterly naive and far from the truth. Many of the items which now seem an integral part of our democratic heritage—techniques of representation, party organization, provision for the role of the opposition, guarantee of minority rights, universal public education—were the result of a long process of germination, growth and maturation. They did not burst into bloom at once. They were the product of the growing experience and practical necessities of a developing historical movement. Freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom from arbitrary judicial procedures were discovered to be imperative if democracy was to function.²⁸ The same is true of the organizational aspects of the modern democratic state. They are the product of democratic life rather than the producers of it.

The fact that these elements of modern democracy were not elaborated by Calvin in 1536 or 1559 does not constitute a denial of parentage. A bud does not have all the characteristics of a full-blown flower, a child does not have all the qualities of an adult, an egg does not even resemble a chicken—but the relationship between them all is direct and intimate. While early Calvinism did not possess all the characteristics of modern democracy, nevertheless it has played an important role in its development. The relationship has been intimate and direct.

²⁸ The problem of religious liberty provided Calvinism with one of the most critical issues it had to face. Early Calvinism insisted upon the necessity of religious uniformity. To have done otherwise would have been to fly in the face of one of the most deeply held political convictions of the age in which it arose. This conviction gave way only when the development of religious diversity made it an impossible ideal. In the presence of diversity men had to learn to live together. Confronted by this necessity, Calvinism was about as successful as any religious tradition, and more successful than some, in formulating a philosophy of toleration to justify the necessity.

DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC TRADITION

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The concept of "democratic rights" does not greatly differ. I suppose, from that of human rights as these are understood by persons of democratic mind and temper. But the existence of human rights is recognized also by persons who could not, even with the most elastic use of words, be described as favorable to democratic principles. Some ambiguities and some prejudicial implications might have been avoided if the term "democratic" had not been used in the title. It seems to presuppose the superiority of a democratic order. That is a popular idea in our political and cultural climate, and I myself hold it with strong conviction: but it is not an axiom upon which a discussion of the rights of man can be based. Particularly, it is not an axiom from which one may profitably or properly begin a consideration of human rights as defined and defended in the Roman Catholic tradition. For while the idea of human rights has an important place in the general course of that tradition, the concept of democracy has a very small place. The civil government of the Papal State is at the farthest extreme from being a democracy and it always has been, even when its jurisdiction covered some thousands of square miles and its subjects were numbered by the hundreds of thousands. More or less democratic forms of government arose in many of the Italian city-states in the Middle Ages, but not in Rome and its subject territory. Yet the medieval Catholic tradition contained certain factors which may fairly be called "democratic values" because they supported basic human rights which are essential to democracy.

Without being too literalistic about the distinction between the "rights of man" and "democratic rights," it may be said that the democratic rights which interest us Americans, in respect both to the domestic situation and to the prospect of a world order worthy of our approval and support, are of two related but distinguishable kinds:

1. The right of individuals to life, liberty, property, and

the pursuit of happiness, and therefore to the freedoms and immunities that are essential to these ends; in general, the rights that are guaranteed in the first ten Amendments to the federal Constitution, which constitute the Bill of Rights, and that will presumably be guaranteed by any international Bill of Rights which may hereafter be framed by the United Nations and recommended to the several nations for their acceptance.

2. The right of the people to determine, by their own free choice, the structure and personnel of their government and, if they so desire, to change it. It is this power to create, control, and alter their government that makes the people's rights democratic. Democracy, I need not remind you, means rule by the people, and not merely their enjoyment of those personal freedoms and immunities which are covered by the Bill of Rights. Every one of these latter might conceivably be enjoyed, and many of them have actually been enjoyed, under the rule of a wise, benevolent, absolute sovereign.

This political right is complicated in practice by many factors which we need not consider here. Obviously, "the people," as a body, cannot exercise the right and power to control their government unless individuals have the right to participate in "the people's" decisions, for collectively they are the people. Yet even in democracies there have always been, and still are, various forms of limitation upon the exercise of political rights by classes of individuals—limitations based upon age, sex, race, literacy, property, poll-tax payment, length of residence in the voting area, and so on. Some of these are repugnant to most Americans of the present day, some are controversial questions, some are generally approved. By and large, the democratic theory is that the personal rights of individuals are so universal, and political rights so essential to the defense of personal rights, that governments cannot safely do less than rest their control on the broadest possible base of popular consent, excluding from the exercise of full political (i.e., voting) rights only those individuals or classes which are deemed incapable of exercising them.

These two classes of rights rest upon different foundations. The private rights of individuals may be guaranteed by the state, as in a Bill of Rights, and whether guaranteed or not they must be respected and defended by the state. But the state does not create them. If, in a sense, the community creates them by the

very act of creating individuals—for the individual is as much the product of the social community as the community is of the co-operation of individuals—still, the political state does not create these private rights. They are implicit in the nature of man. A wicked state may violate them, and a state that does violate them is a wicked state; but the state can neither make nor unmake them. On the other hand, political rights, such as the franchise, are created by the state.

In the opening paragraph of a chapter on "The Rights of the Citizen," in his *The Catholic Church and the Citizen*, Dr. John A. Ryan says:

According to the majority of non-Catholic writers on political science, economics and sociology, there is no such thing as natural rights. All the rights that the citizen possesses are derived from the state. Against it he has no moral right; he has only such immunities and guarantees as are provided in the political constitution. Through proper constitutional changes, a state may deprive the citizen of all his rights, may arbitrarily take away his liberty and his property and even his life.¹

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As a summary of non-Catholic opinion given by an eminent Catholic writer on social and political philosophy, this is an amazing and almost incredible statement. It puts "the majority of non-Catholic writers" in this field squarely on the side of absolute state-ism in its most absolute form. It would have us believe that the right of revolution against even the most tyrannous government has been repudiated by the political theorists of those countries which have gained their freedom and their national existence by revolution. The author admits that the Declaration of Independence makes a passing reference to the fact that "all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," but evidently feels that this was merely a momentary flicker of sentiment, or perhaps a bit of "campaign oratory," representing nothing substantial or enduring in non-Catholic opinion. I must leave to other hands the explanation and defense (if any) of this extraordinary estimate.

Continuing immediately from the quoted paragraph, and contrasting the Catholic position, Dr. Ryan writes:

According to the Catholic doctrine, the individual is endowed with certain moral rights which arise out of his nature, because he is a person and therefore possesses intrinsic worth. These rights are necessary for the welfare of the human person. Both in time and in authority they are

¹ Ryan, John A., The Catholic Church and the Citizen (New York, 1928), 85. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

prior to the state. Since the state does not confer them it cannot take them away.²

This is sound doctrine—Catholic, Protestant, even secularist except in totalitarian circles. And, it may be added, not only can the state not deprive the individual of these rights, but neither can the Church, though either can, under some circumstances, rob men of their power to enjoy them, and both have done so at certain times and places.

A full treatment of democratic rights in the Catholic tradition would necessarily rest upon the following types of data:

- 1. Those universal Christian principles, common to Catholics and all other Christians (though often ignored by both), which constitute the religious grounds for such an evaluation of man as to justify claiming for him certain inalienable personal rights in any human society.
- 2. Classical statements from recognized Catholic authorities (papal encyclicals, edicts of councils, writings of approved theologians, etc.) explicitly or implicitly defining the basis, the extent, and the limitations of the rights of the individual and the nature of civil society and government.
- *3. Historical and contemporary facts illustrating the actual practice of the Roman Catholic Church in either promoting or limiting the exercise of individual rights, personal and political, especially in areas in which the Church was, or is, a predominant or highly potent factor in the social situation.
- 4. Expressions of contemporary Roman Catholic thought on this subject, (a) in such a relatively democratic environment as the United States, and (b) in areas in which the concepts, procedures, and terminology of democracy enjoy less popular prestige than here.

In a brief paper it is obviously impossible to make specific reference to more than a small per cent of the relevant data in any of these categories. Some of them will be scarcely touched. Fairness and historical truth require that no data shall be willfully excluded in the interest of making a consistent picture, whether favorable or unfavorable. A true picture cannot be wholly consistent, for the facts are not. No vast, complex, and long-enduring institution can be uniformly as good as the best, or as bad as the worst, that can be said about it and proved from

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its record. This is equally true of Protestant attitudes toward individual human rights and democratic principles. In saying that the Catholic tradition in relation to democratic rights is not wholly consistent within itself, it is not necessarily implied that there is inconsistency in Catholic dogma or official theory. That question does not come within the scope of my inquiry, though it would be entirely relevant to the general topic. But "tradition" is much more comprehensive than dogma and authoritative pronouncements. It includes all the classes of material that have been enumerated, and perhaps others—actual events, attitudes, and practices as well as the formal pronouncements of Councils and the Holy See.

Data about "democracy" or "democratic rights" in any tradition of long continuance cannot be found by looking under "D" in any alphabetical index of historical materials covering the whole sweep of the Christian centuries. Democracy is a modern word; Greek, of course, in its origin, but it had a longer and a deeper sleep than other classical concepts; and it awoke later, and presently began to have a changed content, with less exclusive reference to a form of government and a wider connotation of respect for the universal rights of man as a person. The Oxford Dictionary is my authority for saying that the go uno resting solely upon the popular will. The first three citations are these:

1576 Fleming: Panopl. Epist. 198. "Democracie, when the multitude have government."

1586 T. B.: La Primaud, Fr. Acad. 549. "Democratie, where free and poore men beeing the greater number, are lords of the estate."

1664 H. More: Myst. Iniq. 514. "Presbytery verges nearer toward Populacy or Democracy."

It may also be safely assumed that Lord Byron, one hundred and fifty years later, was thinking of the control of government by popular vote when he wrote in his *Diary* (May 1821): "What is democracy?—an aristocracy of blackguards." Perhaps he did not realize that even then, in at least one country in the world, a guarantee of personal liberty by a Bill of Rights had been linked with the practice of government by the consent of the governed, and that the way had thus been opened for an enrichment of the concept of democracy. The conclusion I wish to draw from these notes on the history of the word is that we must not expect

to find it attached to affirmations of the rights of man before the eighteenth century. The medieval Christian tradition contained some democratic values, but they did not bear that label. For a period of fifteen centuries or more, covering the greater part of history of the Roman Catholic Church and the first two centuries of Protestantism, nobody believed in political democracy—except a few prophetic and adventurous souls. Within this period we must be prepared to recognize all defenses of human rights as relevant to our theme, even though the defenders would have spurned the idea that all men, equal in the eyes of God, should also be political equals.

Religious liberty must occupy a prominent place in any study of this topic, since it is what we call a democratic right at least in so far as religious liberty means the freedom of the individual to practice and propagate the religion he believes to be true. This is not, to be sure, a definition of religious liberty which any qualified Catholic spokesman will accept without restriction at one point and extension at another. In the Catholic view, as I shall show, religious liberty includes not only such rights as the individual may legitimately claim but also certain special liberties and rights for the Church—only for the Roman Catholic Church, of course—as a unique, supernatural entity. The special rights of the Church are based upon revelation. The right of individuals to the exercise of religious liberty rests upon natural law, and it can be called a democratic right because all people have it. (Here the emphasis is upon demos, not upon kratein; the form of the political structure, whether or not a democracy, is irrelevant.)

One of the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter was freedom of religion. Long before this statement was issued, I had for years been urging the point that religious liberty is simply civil liberty exercised in the field of religion and that it is inadequately based and precariously held in any regime which does not guarantee the full range of civil liberties to every individual. My assertion is that religious liberty is valid and defensible only as it results from and is included in the complete civil liberty of individuals—that if men are not free to think, speak, publish, teach, assemble, and organize, then they are not free men; but if their general right to do these things is guaranteed, then they are free to do them in relation to religion, and this constitutes religious liberty. I have found much reluctance

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to accept this view, and I have been much interested to discover a strong affirmation of something very like it in the recent writing of a Jesuit, J. Courtney Murray, from whom I shall presently quote at length on other topics.

But there are two essential differences between the Jesuit writer's view and mine, and about these much of the subsequent discussion will revolve:

- 1. The first concerns the points at which, and the presuppositions under which, the exercise of these rights of individuals may properly be limited by the state in the interest of the "common good" as defined by the "collective conscience" of the community. That there are limits is obvious. The line is not easy to draw, and the courts have not always been consistent in their decisions—for example, in the many cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses within the past ten years. The definition of that "common good" by which individual rights are limited, especially in the practice and promotion of religious beliefs, is perhaps the crucial point in distinguishing Catholic from non-Catholic views of religious liberty, and therefore of the whole category of civil rights of which religious liberty is one application.
- 2. The second point at which the Catholic view differs from the one which I have stated as my own is the Catholic assertion that religious liberty includes not only the rights of individuals to think, teach, publish, organize, etc., in the field of religion, but also certain specific rights of the Church as such, based upon divine revelation which gives the Church (i.e., the Roman Catholic Church) a unique status in the community, unlike that of any merely human institution.

At the risk of some repetition of topics, I shall indicate what seem to be the most important relevant points in three Catholic

books of good standing on this theme. These are:

The Rights of Man and Natural Law. By Jacques Maritain. 1943.

Catholic Principles of Politics. By John A. Ryan and Francis J. Boland.

1940. (A revised edition of The State and the Church by Ryan and Miller, 1922.)

Freedom of Religion. By J. Courtney Murray, S. J. 1945. (A pamphlet, reprinted from Theological Studies.)

Professor Maritain presents a well grounded Christian view of the nature of man and the differentia between human personality and other forms of existence in the natural order, and on this he builds a spacious structure of human rights. Man,

as a person, is more than "a mere parcel of matter." "The notion of personality thus involves that of totality and independence... To say that a man is a person is to say that in the depth of his being he is more a whole than a part and more independent than servile. It is to this mystery of our nature that religious thought points when it says that the human person is the image of God. . . . A person possesses absolute dignity because he is in direct relationship with the absolute, in which alone he can find his complete fulfillment. . . . Society is a whole whose parts are themselves wholes, and it is an organism composed of liberties, not just of vegetative cells. It has its own good and its own work which are distinct from the good and the work of individuals which constitute it. But this good and this work must be essentially human, and consequently become perverted if they do not contribute to the development and improvement of human persons." The aim of society is the "common good" —i.e., common to the whole and its constituent persons. It is essential that there be authority in society, but it will be an authority seeking the good of all and respecting the value and freedom of every person. This excludes totalitarianism.

"The immediate object of the temporal community," says Maritain, "is human life with its natural activities and virtues and the human common good." But these are inseparable from the moral and spiritual ends which man's nature demands for its completeness. Only a Christian state can escape the totalitarian alternative. But what is a Christian state? The "clerical" or "pharisaically Christian state," such as existed under "the least truly Christian governments of the absolutist era," will not do.

A vitally and truly Christian political society would be Christian by virtue of the very spirit that animates it and that gives shape to its structures. . . . Such a political society would not require of its members a common religious creed and would not place in a position of inferiority or political disadvantage those who are strangers to the faith that animates it. And all alike, Catholics and non-Catholics, Christians and non-Christians—from the moment that they recognize, each in his own way, the human values of which the Gospel has made us aware, the dignity and the rights of the person, the character of moral obligation inherent in authority, the law of brotherly love and the sanctity of natural law—would be drawn into the dynamism of such a society and would be able to cooperate for its common good. It is not by virtue of a system of privileges and means of pressure and external compulsion; it is by virtue of internal forces de-

³ Maritain, Jacques: The Rights of Man and Natural Law (New York, 1943), 3.4, 7. By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons, publishers.

veloped within the people and emanating from the people; it is by virtue of institutions, manners and customs, that such a political society might be called Christian, not in appearance, but in its substance.4

Maritain's enumeration of human rights can be quoted, without significant omissions, as indicating the liberal social viewpoint which he represents:

Rights of the human person as such: The right to existence—The right to personal liberty or the right to conduct one's own life as master of oneself and of one's acts, responsible for them before God and the law of the community.—The right to the pursuit of the perfection of rational and moral human life.—The right to the pursuit of eternal life along the path which conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God.—The right of the Church and other religious families to the free exercise of their spiritual activity.—The right of pursuing a religious vocation; the freedom of religious orders and groups.—The right to marry according to one's choice and to raise a family. . . .—The right to property.—Finally, the right to be treated as a person, not as a thing.

Rights of the civic person: The right of every citizen to participate actively in political life, and in particular the right of equal suffrage for all. [Compare and contrast the last sentence in John A. Ryan's chapter on "The Rights of the Citizen" which is the last chapter in his book, The Catholic Church and the Citisen: "The elective franchise is not among the natural rights of the individual. It is created by the state for a civil purpose which might conceivably be attained, and in several countries has been attained, without universal sufferage." Now back to Maritain: | The right of the people to establish the Constitution of the State and to determine for themselves their form of government.—The right of association, limited only by the juridically recognized necessities of the common good, and in particular the right to form political parties or political schools.—The right of free investigation and discussion (freedom of expression). (Footnote: these rights are especially important in political life.)—Political equality and the equal right of every citizen to his security and his liberties within the state.—The equal right of every one to the guarantees of an independent judiciary power.—Equal possibility of admission to public employment and free access to the various professions.

Rights of the social person, and more particularly of the working person: The right freely to choose his work.—The right freely to form vocational groups or trade-unions.—The right of the worker to be considered socially as an adult.—The right of economic groups (trade-unions and working communities) and other social groups to freedom and autonomy.—The right to a just wage. The right to work. And wherever an associative system can be substituted for the wage system, the right to the joint ownership and joint management of the enterprise, and to the "worker's title." The right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick benefits and social security. The right to have a part, free of charge, depending on the possibilities

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⁴ Ibid., 24-5.

of the community, in the elementary goods, both material and spiritual, of civilization.5

One need not labor the point that this is a liberal charter of social and political rights. In the same vein, as regards eronomic and industrial questions, are Dom Virgil Michael's book and John A. Ryan's Distributive Justice. All these affirmations of the rights of man in the world of modern industry, together with the papal declarations which parallel them, have their roots in a conception of man which is not only a part of the longstanding Catholic tradition but, viewing history still more widely, is also a part of the immemorial and universal Christian tradition. It is only in relatively recent times, however, that Catholic Christians or any others have discovered these social implications of their faith.

One or two other aspects of Maritain's position require attention as bearing upon the question of religious liberty and the relation of the state to the Church. The civil society, he says. "must cooperate with religion, not by any kind of theocracy or clericalism nor by exercising any sort of pressure in religious matters, but by respecting and facilitating, on the basis of the rights and liberties of each of us, the spiritual activity of the Church and of the diverse religious families which are grouped within the temporal community."6 But "respecting and facilitating" the spiritual activity of the diverse religious groups does not mean equal treatment of them. Maritain continues: "The Catholic Church insists upon the principle that truth must have precedence over error and that the true religion, when it is known, should be aided in its spiritual mission in preference to religions whose message is more or less faltering and in which error is mingled with truth."7 This clearly means that the state should aid the Roman Catholic Church in its spiritual mission to a greater degree than it aids any other group. Aid it how? That is not entirely clear. It is clear, however, that this author disavows any claim to temporal or financial advantage for the Church. "To inject into political society," he says, "a special or partial common good, the temporal common good of the faithful of one religion, even though it were the true religion, and which would claim for them a privileged position in the state, would be to inject into political society a divisive principle and, to that ex-

⁵ Ibid., 111-114.

⁶ Ibid., 22. 7 Ibid., 25-6.

tent, to jeopardize the temporal common good."8 It remains, then, for him to define the ways in which the state should specially facilitate the work of the Roman Catholic Church without giving it financial subsidy or political power, without giving its adherents any preferential treatment in temporal matters, and without placing the members of other religious groups unfairly at disadvantage. The scope of his book does not require, and its brevity perhaps does not permit, that he should give these particulars. In the Catholic tradition in general, I find no solicitude for the avoidance of these ways of giving the Roman Catholic Church kinds of preferential treatment which Maritain here seems explicitly to renounce—and, I think, does sincerely renounce. In contrast with this aspect of his position, we find, for example, that every concordat ever signed between the Vatican and a civil government has been a charter of special privileges for the Church to the disadvantage of others (unless one accepts the Catholic argument that the prevalence of Catholicism is really for the "common good" of all even though the others do not think so); that Innocent X, in the bull zelo Domus Dei (1648), declared the Peace of Westphalia null and void because, among other reasons, it gave the heretics (Protestants) equal rights to worship and hold property in certain areas; that Ryan and others clearly teach that, under ideal conditions, the state would permit non-Catholic worship only in private and inconspicuous ways and would suppress non-Catholic propaganda; that the Peruvian bishops, supported by the Apostolic vicars, declared in December, 1943, their regret that the constitution of their country had been so amended that all non-Catholic forms of worship are no longer excluded by law; that J. Courtney Murray, S. J., argues (op. cit.) that it is quite reasonable and proper for the constitution of Argentina to make a non-Catholic ineligible to the presidency, because the "corporate conscience" of the country demands it.

It is very evident, therefore, that Maritain's generous limitations upon the preference which the state should give to the Catholic Church are a marginal phenomenon and do not represent the main stream of the Catholic tradition. Further, there is a certain ambiguity in his use of the phrase, "the common good." No one can plausibly deny that, in law as in morals, the exercise of individual rights must be limited by consideration of

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⁸ Ibid., 27.

the common good. Every government does this every day, and without it there could be no government and no society. As the interdependence of men in modern industrial society becomes more intricate, vital, and far-reaching, these limitations upon private rights become more necessary and more numerous. This is the fundamental fact that is in the minds of those (including Maritain) who repudiate, often with scorn, what they call "outmoded bourgeois liberalism." But the concept of the "common good" requires as careful analysis and delimitation as does that of individual rights. The reason we have a Bill of Rights in the Constitution is to tell Congress what it cannot do to individuals under the pretext that the general welfare requires it. Caiaphas was the man who declared it "expedient that one man should die for the people"; but democratic society does not accept that as a principle of law, nor does Christian society when it is concerned with justice. The Catholic writers with one accord. from St. Thomas Aguinas to the youngest Thomist, agree in saving that man, being akin to God and therefore a citizen of two worlds, has rights which the secular state cannot over-ride for the promotion of any temporal ends however urgent. the "common good" is defined as including not only temporal welfare but also those factors of morals, faith and worship upon which man's eternal welfare is believed to depend; and if it is held to be the duty of the state to facilitate the work of the one Church which is deemed capable of protecting these spiritual and eternal interests; then it is not clear that the state would be subject to any inhibitions whatever in suppressing any rights of individuals the exercise of which is deemed prejudicial to the spiritual welfare of the community and its members. good" affords an escape clause that requires constant scrutiny.

A similar ambiguity shrouds the term "public policy" as used in Article 2 of the "International Declaration of the Rights of Man," adopted in 1929 by the (Catholic) Institute of International Law: "It is the duty of every State to recognize for every individual the right to the free exercise, both public and private, of every faith, religion or belief of which the practice is not incompatible with *public policy and good morals.*" In this proposed international bill of rights there is no general provision for freedom of speech, assembly and publication, and nothing to prevent any state from ruling that the practice or propaganda of any religion other than Roman Catholicism is "incompatible with public policy." On the other hand, in guaranteeing

"for every individual, free use of and instruction in the language of his choice," and in declaring that "the state cannot refuse to any of its nationals, regardless of sex, race, language or religion, equal access to institutions of public instruction and exercise of different economic activities, professions and industries" (Arts 3 and 4), there is no recognition of "public policy" as a limiting factor. (This International Declaration is printed as an Appendix in Maritain's book.)

In reading Maritain, one vibrates constantly between these two poles—the assertion of the inviolability of human rights, and the provision for keeping their exercise within the bounds of the "common good" and the security of the social order. One or two more extracts:

The universe of truths-of science, of wisdom and of poetry-towards which the intelligence tends by itself, belongs by nature to a plane higher than the political community. The power of the State and of social interests cannot impose itself upon this universe. (Although it can and must oppose, within the social body, the propagation of errors which might threaten the fundamental ethics of common life and the principles on which it is founded.)9

After a rather full enumeration of private and civil rights, we read:

All these rights are rooted in the vocation of the person (a spiritual and free agent) to the order of absolute values and to a destiny superior to time. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man framed these rights in the altogether rationalistic point of view of the Enlightenment and the Encyclopedists, and to that extent enveloped them in ambiguity, The American Declaration, however marked by the influence of Locke and "natural religion," adhered more closely to the originally Christian character of human rights.10

Comment: If human rights are defined as essentially "Christian" and as rooted in man's "vocation to the order of absolute values and to a destiny superior to time," and if the Roman Catholic Church is, as it claims to be, the highest authority on earth in regard to those absolute values and that destiny, then it becomes plausibly arguable that whatever is unfavorable to the spread of Catholicism may properly be suppressed by the state and that not only without trespassing upon the rights of man but actually to their enhancement by promoting the "order of absolute values" in which those rights inhere. However, let Maritain resume:

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⁹ Ibid., 76.

¹⁰ Ibid., 80.

The first of these rights is that of the human person to make its way toward its eternal destiny along the path which its conscience has recognized as the path indicated by God. With respect to God and truth, one has not the right to choose according to his own whim any path whatsoever; he must choose the true path, in so far as it is in his power to know it. But with respect to the State, to the temporal community and the temporal power, he is free to choose his religious path at his own risk; his freedom of choice is a natural, inviolable right. Footnote.—If this religious path goes so very far afield that it leads to acts repugnant to natural law and the security of the state, the latter has the right to interdict and apply sanctions against these acts. This does not mean that it has authority in the realm of conscience.¹¹

This brings us back to that same inescapable and unanswered question. Earlier it was: What is the common good? Here it is: What are the moral and religious requirements for the security of the state? Maritain does not answer this question decisively. Catholic tradition, however, gives a very clear answer: Religious homogeneity is essential to social stability and political security. That principle was a central feature of Catholic political and social philosophy for a thousand years. It furnished the rational ground for the persecution of heretics and the exclusion of Jews from the political and social structure. (Incidentally, I think this idea is historically the main tap-root of anti-Semitism.) The Reformation did little, at first, to oppose this theory. Only the despised Anabaptists, and then the Baptists, challenged it. The Protestant state churches still clung to what Troeltsch ambiguously calls the "church-type" concept of the church—that is, the idea of a church as the one religious structure including all the people within a nation, as the state is the one political structure. The established churches had varying degrees of success in persuading their governments that religious dissent was dangerous to the state. This idea gradually lost ground in Protestantism, because experience disproved it and there was no dogma to sustain it. I think it may be said that this idea has virtually disappeared from the Protestant world. It has not disappeared from the strongly Catholic countries and, so far as I can discover, it has not even grown dim in the minds of most Catholic writers or at the Vatican. Ryan and Murray presuppose it. Maritain does not deny it in principle. Leo XIII, in Immortale Dei, is quite explicit about it.

The pastoral letter of the Peruvian bishops and archbishops (1943), to which reference was made, is one of the clearest and

11 Ibid., 81-2.

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most recent statements of this idea that religious solidarity is essential to the political stability of a Catholic state. letter the bishops lament the success of "the Protestant sects in combination with anti-Catholic societies" in securing the repeal of Article IV of the Peruvian constitution which had "declared the Apostolic Roman Catholic faith to be the state religion to the exclusion of all other forms of worship"—an article which the bishops declare to have been "a sacred bulwark of our religious belief and a powerful restraint against sectarian audacity." After an extended and highly derogatory description of Protestant missionaries—"posing as teachers of religion, belching forth upon the ignorant populace from their soap-boxes the whole content of their falsehood, etc."—the pastoral letter comes to the principle immediately in question: "There is no more corrosive solvent than diversity of creed for disuniting the members of a community. Whoever attempts to violate our spiritual unity, attacks, therefore, our nationality." The bishops quote with approval the written comment of the Cardinal of Rio de Janeiro (May 30, 1930) on the work of the Y.M.C.A.: "We would remind the Catholics of Brazil that the dechristianization of our country by neo-paganism, or its decatholicization by Protestantism, is equivalent to its denationalization; it violates the spirit of its secular traditions, saps the vital strength that laid the foundations of its national greatness, and is a fearsome danger that threatens us in our very unity and political existence."

This letter of the Peruvian bishops and archbishops is more than a local episode expressing a regional view, for it was signed by two Apostolic vicars appointed directly from and responsible directly to Rome.

The weight of the testimony seems to support the conclusion that, when Catholic writers say that the exercise of individual rights must be limited by considerations of the common good and the stability of the state, they are thinking not only of the requirements of common decency and economic justice and the protection of the government against conspiracies for its overthrow, but also of the common good and social stability in terms of the present or prospective predominance of the Roman Catholic religion and Church.

Relevant passages in Leo XIII's encyclical, *Immortale Dei* confirm this view. "Every civilized community," he says, "must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society

itself, has its source in nature and has, consequently, God for its author. . . . The right to rule is not necessarily, however, bound up with any special form of government. It may take this or that form, provided only that it be a nature to insure the general welfare." Many expressions in the encyclical clearly indicate that the "general welfare" includes as a basic element the general prevalence of the Roman Catholic religion, as in the medieval period when the Church, "established firmly in befitting dignity. flourished everywhere, by the favor of princes and the legitimate protection of magistrates; and Church and State were happily united in concord and friendly interchange of good offices." The encyclical gives no countenance to any conception of "general welfare" which does not match this picture, or to any form of government which is not conducive to this end. Further quotations from the encyclical, at some length, reflect the authoritative Roman Catholic view of democratic government and an equalitarian society:

Sad it is to call to mind how the harmful and lamentable rage for innovation which rose to a climax in the 16th century, threw first of all into confusion the Christian religion, and next, by natural sequence, invaded the precincts of philosophy, whence it spread to all classes of society. From this source, as from a fountain-head, burst forth all those later tenets of unbridled license which, in the midst of the terrible upheavals of the last century, were wildly conceived and boldly proclaimed as the principles and foundation of that new jurisprudence which was not merely previously unknown, but was at variance on many points with not only the Christian but even with the natural law.

Among these principles the main one lays down that, as all men are alike by race and nature, so in like manner all are equal in the control of their life; that each one is so far his own master as to be in no sense under the rule of any other individual; that each is free to think on every subject just as he may choose, and to do whatever he may like to do; that no man has any right to rule over other men. In a society grounded upon such maxims, all government is nothing more or less than the will of the people, and the people, being under the power of itself alone, is alone its own ruler. It does choose, nevertheless, some to whose charge it may commit itself, but in such wise that it makes over to them not the right so much as the business of governing, to be exercised, however, in its name. The authority of God is passed over in silence, just as if there were no God. . . . Thus the state becomes nothing but a multitude which is its own master and ruler. And since the populace is declared to contain within itself the spring-head of all rights and of all power, it follows that the State does not consider itself bound by any kind of duty toward God. Moreover, it believes that it is not obliged to make public profession of any religion; or to inquire which of the very many religions is the only true one; or to prefer one

religion to all the rest; or to show to any form of religion special favor; but, on the contrary, is bound to grant equal rights to every creed, so that public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious belief.

And it is part of this theory that all questions that concern religion are to be referred to private judgment; that every one is to be free to follow whatever religion he prefers, or none at all if he disapproves of all. From this the following consequences logically flow: that the judgment of each one's conscience is independent of all law; that the most unrestrained opinions may be openly expressed as to the practice or omission of divine worship; and that everyone has unbounded license to think whatever he chooses and to publish abroad whatever he thinks. . . .

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Especially with reference to the so-called "liberties" which are so greatly coveted in these days, all must stand by the judgment of the Apostolic See, and have the same mind.

Forty years before the date of this encyclical—that is, in 1845—Orestes Brownson wrote in his *Quarterly Review*: "Democracy is a mischievous dream wherever the Catholic Church does not predominate to inspire the people with reverence and to accustom them to obedience to authority."

Turning now to Ryan and Boland's Catholic Principles of Politics, one finds a much more comprehensive treatment, only a few points of which can be touched upon here. This book is a thorough revision (1940) of an earlier edition (1922) which bore the title, The State and the Church, by Ryan and Millar. The passages most often quoted from the older book are retained in the newer one. They therefore evidently express the senior author's mature judgment. Both books are copyrighted by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and the earlier one was written expressly for the N.C.W.C.'s Department of Social Action. The work is therefore no abstract or theoretical treatise, but is designed as a guide to social action. In both editions we find that "the state must not only have care for religion but recognize the true religion," and it is expressly, though needlessly, specified that "this means the form of religion professed by the Catholic Church." We learn that "voluntary toleration of error" by the state cannot be justified; and that, in a Catholic state correctly united with the Church, persons born in a non-Catholic sect may properly be permitted to practice their own religion, but only "within the family or in an inconspicuous manner." The right of non-Catholics to enjoy any greater degree of liberty in a state where the Catholic Church is strong enough to prevent it, is swept away by the rhetorical question, "How

can error have rights?" In his exposition of Leo XIII's 1885 encyclical, *Immortale Dei* (The Christian Constitution of States), Dr. Ryan summarizes the pontifical argument for the union of church and state, for the support of the one true church by the state, and for suppression of "the propagation of false doctrine" by the police power of the state. From that point he continues:

Superficial champions of religious liberty will promptly and indignantly denounce the foregoing propositions as the essence of intolerance. They are intolerant, but not therefore unreasonable. Error has not the same rights as truth. Since the profession and practice of error are contrary to human welfare, how can error have rights? How can the voluntary toleration of error be justified? The men who defend the principle of toleration for all varieties of religious opinion assume either that all religions are equally true, or that the true cannot be distinguished from the false. On no other ground is it logically possible to accept the theory of indiscriminate and universal toleration."12

This familiar and unaltered passage bears the *imprimatur* of Cardinal Hayes in the old edition, of Cardinal Spellman in the new one, and the *Nihil obstat* of A. J. Scanlon, Censor Librorum, in both. The passage neither requires explaining nor admits explaining away. It casts a cold, clear light on one phase of Catholic tradition and contemporary opinion concerning the rights of man. But there are other phases, and Dr. Ryan's comments on one or two of them must not be omitted.

The foundations of civil government and of the rights of man both under civil government and apart from it are tested by the right of the people to change their form of government. With regard to this right, Ryan is immeasurably more liberal and "democratic" than the writers he cites as exhibiting the main current of Catholic tradition and recent Catholic thought. Do the people have a right, he asks, to terminate the rule of a king with whom a substantial majority of the people have become dissatisfied? "Apparently," he says, "Catholic moralists would answer these questions in the negative. Even when the grievances of the people are considerably greater than we are assuming, most Catholic writers seem to think that a sufficient remedy can be found in the device of passive resistance which is designed to correct but not to expel the reigning monarch." Suarez and Bellarmine are quoted as concurring in this view. But what if

¹² Ryan and Boland: Catholic Principles of Politics (New York, 1940), 318. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

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the monarch is expelled and a "usurper" takes his place? How and when can the new king and his line become legitimate? "The general teaching of recent Catholic writers seems to be that the rule of the usurper cannot become morally legitimate before the end of two or three generations. Cannot the usurping government be legitimized at any time by the consent of the people? The answer of these writers is a decided negative." Michael J. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, is quoted in support of this repudiation of the right of revolution. From this reactionary support of the principle of "legitimacy," Ryan dissents with the vigor of the late Mr. Justice Holmes. He says:

In common with the more recent Catholic writers, Dr. Cronin enlarges upon the ruling right of the deposed monarch in such terms as to convey the impression that his moral claim to the scepter is about as strong as his claim to his house or his hat. The wrong done the ruler when he is deprived of his throne is represented in such a way as to suggest that it is only slightly, if at all, different from that which he suffers when he is robbed of his household furniture. To whatever extent this assumption may be latent in the minds or arguments of the Catholic writers we are considering, the simple truth is that the governing authority of the monarch is in no sense proprietary. It is entirely fiduciary, conferred upon him not at all for his own benefit but solely for the good of the community. When it ceases to promote the latter end, it may properly be transferred to someone else by any process that is reasonable, as the deliberate adhesion of the people to a usurping ruler who can provide at least as good a government as the one which has been overthrown.¹³

This is a clear statement of the right of revolution, and that without any reference to whether the expelled king is a Catholic or not. It is just as clear a statement that Catholic tradition does not, in general, support this position. Most of what has been said applies explicitly only to a possible change of monarchs, not to a change from monarchy to some other form of government. But the Catholic tradition which requires three generations to legitimize a new dynasty that displaces an expelled tyrant would certainly be no more complacent toward a republic. Ryan says of Cronin and that "majority of modern Catholic writers" who agree with him that their position rests on "the assumption that the theory of the right of popular determination and choice, as between the old and the new government, gives too much encouragement to the social forces that stir up and make unjustifiable revolutions," and that "the people are constitutionally prone to sanction political changes without suffi-

13 Ibid., 95.

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cient reason." After demolishing the arguments of the "recent Catholic writers" who have so low an opinion of the moral and political competence of the people, Ryan asserts that the people have a clear right "to command an inefficient king to depart, and the right to replace his government by a republic or a constitutional monarch." It is rather shocking to find that he has to establish this position against the preponderant opinion of even recent Catholic writers. I think it is probably true—though I have not checked these authorities to prove it—that these writers were especially concerned to support the Spanish monarchy or. in temporary default of that, at least to assert the illegitimacy of the Spanish republican government. Similarly, in the early part of the nineteenth century the strongly anti-democratic utterances of Leo XII and others had their immediate motive in the threat which the democratic movement offered to the entrenched position of the Church.

Father Murray's monograph on Religious Liberty will have to be passed over with far less attention than it deserves. Though brief (30 pages) it is perhaps the most carefully studied and clearly expressed recent Roman Catholic statement on this subject and on the relation of religious liberty to civil liberty. This author begins with the proposition that the question of religious liberty raises the deeper question of the nature of religion. This "cannot be fully answered in terms of reason and natural law The decisive answer must come from revelation: and revelation resolves the question into a more concrete form— What is the Church of Christ? Actually, therefore, it is one's concept of the Church of Christ that is the decisive element here. The nature of the problem dictates that the process of honest thought must be to work through to a properly theological solution, and then to draw out its political implications and propose these for realization in the temporal order. And it will be impossible to propose one's political solution except in the perspectives of one's theological solution."

This is a way of saying in advance that Roman Catholics and Protestants can never agree in regard to religious liberty so long as they remain Roman Catholics and Protestants. This is true because the Catholic is not satisfied to let the matter rest on the easy live-and-let-live principle—the assumption that people actually do differ and that they have a right to hold and propagate their diverse opinions. Murray says: "For our part, we

cannot admit the validity of solutions based on certain ever more self-assertive theories of the 'autonomy of conscience,' 'religious pluralism,' 'democratic ideals,' 'cultural equilibrium through diversity,' etc.—theories that we must consider false and inadequate."

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A great part of Murray's argument takes the form of a critique of the *Statement on Religious Liberty* issued by a joint committee of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the Foreign Missions Conference of North America. This Protestant *Statement*

- (1) Recognizes "the dignity of the human person as the image of God";
- (2) Urges that the civic rights which derive from that dignity be vindicated in treaties and guarded by international organizations;
- (3) Demands specifically that "the rights of individuals everywhere to religious liberty shall be recognized and . . . guaranteed against legal provisions and administrative acts which would impose political, economic or social disabilities on grounds of religion;
- (4) Defines religious liberty as including "freedom to worship according to conscience and to bring up children in the faith of their parents; freedom for the individual to change his religion; freedom to preach, educate, publish and carry on missionary activities; and freedom to organize with others, and to acquire and hold property, for these purposes."

The most significant feature of the Catholic writer's attitude toward this declaration is his refusal to accept it. His specific criticisms of the Statement are on two main grounds: First, while it professes to base religious liberties upon natural civil rights, it does not actually do so, but gives them an absoluteness which civil rights do not have; and second, it does not take into account the special liberties of the Roman Catholic Church, which "are not an aspect of political liberty, but sui generis," because the Church is "a society that is itself juridically perfect, independent in its own sphere, and dowered with rights from another source (positive divine law) than that which is the first source of political liberties (the law of nature)."

The first of these points gives opportunity for an excellent statement of a thesis that I have myself urged on many occasions

—that the religious liberty of individuals is merely the exercise of civil liberty in a particular field, and that it exists precariously, if at all, wherever the individual's civil liberties are not fully recognized and protected. Murray is right in saying that this view is not generally accepted by Protestants. He is less right in finding it rejected in the *Statement*, which explicitly urges the adoption of an international bill of civil rights as preliminary to the assurance of the specific religious liberties it enumerates. But Murray's expression of his own position is more important than his interpretation of the *Statement*. After grouping the enumerated religious liberties under two heads, he says:

... from the standpoint of the natural law, these two freedoms are not to be considered categories apart, privileged and absolute. Actually, from this standpoint alone, the right of religious propaganda and the right of religious organization are simply aspects of the general human rights of free association and of free discussion. They have no natural foundation separate from the foundation of these more general rights, nor have they any privileged absolutism. The natural law grants no more privileged right to organize for religious purposes than to organize for economic purposes. And, simply because an idea is religious, it has from the natural law no more absolute right to be propagated than if it were merely political.

Incidentally, I may say that I agree heartily, and the idea could not be more clearly stated. The heavy emphasis, it will be observed, is upon the standpoint of natural law. Everything Murray here asserts is asserted as true within the limits of natural law. He is preparing the way for two lines of development from this thesis: first, that religious liberties of the individual, like all other natural rights, are valid only within limits prescribed by the "common good," which he is ready to define in the peculiarly Roman Catholic terms previously indicated; and second. that the religious liberties of individuals constitute only a fraction of the totality of religious liberty, since, as stated a moment ago, the Roman Catholic Church has a class of liberties which, by definition, cannot conflict with the common good and which are absolute as against any limits that might be imposed by the social or political situation because they are conferred upon it directly by the act of God.

The particular features of the Protestant Statement which Father Murray views with most acute disfavor are its protest against political disabilities on the ground of religion and its demand for the right to preach, publish, and propagate religion anywhere. He sees no impropriety in the disqualification of a non-Catholic for the presidency of Argentina, because the "corporate conscience" of the state demands a Catholic president. Similarly, he would consider the exclusion of Protestant missionaries from South America as entirely proper. On the basis of the principles which he lays down, Protestant and Catholic religious rights and liberties are by no means identical. Protestants have only what can be derived from natural law and general civil rights, and these are always subject to limitation within the scope of what the community considers the common good. Catholics have all these, but also another range of rights derived from the positive divine law which has made the Roman Catholic Church unique.

A concluding summary:

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- 1. Medieval Catholic political theory was that, in principle, royal power rests upon consent of the people, but this consent was generally thought of as having been given in the distant past and as being irrevocable. The feudal system did not lend itself to free popular elections. The consent principle must be understood very loosely. Political power comes from God to the community. The community consists of classes having widely different rights and privileges. Political equalitarianism was not even thought of as a possibility. The feudal system, combining land tenure with government, tended to support the proprietary conception of royal power which Ryan so clearly renounces. Catholic tradition did not renounce it and, in general, has been a strong supporter of the principle of "legitimacy." The theory that power comes from God to the people, and thence to the king, as voiced by Suarez and Bellarmine, was a useful argument against royal absolutism, which would not only have crushed popular government but would have set up a civil absolutism rivaling that of the pope. The development of democratic practices was neither the purpose nor the result of the Suarez-Bellarmine thesis. Ryan and Boland summarize Gaillard Hunt's claim that Jefferson derived the main ideas of the Declaration of Independence from these Catholic writers, but make no allusion to David Schaff's desolating rebuttal of that claim.
- 2. On the basis of the common Christian view of man, as the child of God, a being with inherent qualities and values other

than those of the material and animal world, classic and modern Catholic statements defend basic human rights as against the tyranny of civil rulers. In the encyclicals of Leo XIII and later popes there has been strong support of economic rights and distributive justice.

- 3. The rights of man are held to be grounded in natural law, and to be limited by consideration of the "common good." The common good is defined as including man's moral and spiritual welfare, and this is viewed as inseparable from his acceptance of the "true" religion, which is that of the Roman Catholic Church. This implies a limitation of religious liberty—that is, its limitation to what is frequently called "true" liberty, the liberty to believe and teach what is "true." But this limitation is itself limited by the principle that belief cannot be coerced, that no man can be forced to become a Catholic against his will, and that, so far as the state is concerned, a man may believe what he will, at his own soul's risk. The state may, however, limit teaching and publishing to the propagation of what is "true" and conducive to the "common good," as previously defined.
- 4. Religious liberty includes not only the individual's right to believe (but not necessarily to proclaim publicly) what he deems true, but also certain specific rights of the "true" Church—its right to recognition by the governent and to an official pre-eminence over any other religious organizations that may be permitted to exist. The actual realization of this declared right must be conditioned: (a) by the existence of a predominantly Catholic society, the "corporate conscience" of which will support the recognition of the Catholic Church's unique position as essential to the common good and the stability of the social order; and (b) by the provisions of any existing constitutions, which must be observed if they forbid the preferential treatment of any one church by the state, but which "may be changed."
- 5. Official Catholic views have never favored political democracy. The modern position is that no particular form of government monopolizes the favor of the Church. But historically, the weight of its influence has been on the side of monarchy. This is natural, since democratic government appeared late in the history of the Church. When it did appear (outside of the United States), it was associated with revolutionary movements which appeared to be (and sometimes were) antireligious in their efforts to be anti-clerical, and which in any case

endangered the entrenched position of the Catholic Church, which was closely associated with the secular privileged classes that were being dispossessed. Beginning in the United States without prestige, privileges or property, the Church had nothing to lose and could afford to go along with the democratic movement.

THE CHRISTIAN FAITH AND RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE

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One of the greatest achievements of the democratic state is the establishment of religious tolerance or the freedom of religion. This fact confronts the church with an opportunity that it has not yet fully realized. It still has to perform important tasks in connection with religious liberty. This is due mainly to the fact that it was by political and not by ecclesiastical action that the practice of tolerance was secured. To be sure, the fathers of American democracy were influenced by Christian ideas and movements when they provided for the freedom of religion, but these represented radical minorities within Christendom and not the larger churches. Indeed, the major impetus toward tolerance came as a reaction against the practice of persecution of religious minorities by majorities and it was inspired by a view of religion that was critical of the traditional religious and social reasons for intolerance.

For centuries, political thinkers had been accustomed to the principle that no peace and concord could prevail in a state or commonwealth unless there existed among the people uniformity particularly in matters of faith. Until the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century all states were organized according to this requirement.

The Romans permitted a variety of religions to exist in their Empire, but they did not grant religious liberty. They required all their citizens and subjects to demonstrate the religious uniformity of the state by participation in the emperor-worship. Such groups as the Jews who on account of their monotheism were unable and unwilling to bow before the altars of the Roman deity, were given the privilege of being excused from the observance of the general rule. But this was not because their faith was regarded as universally valid, but because it was deemed to be the national religion of the Jewish race. The fact that the Jews were non-conformists and that as such they occupied a special place in society, led to the rise of popular mistrust of

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them. Because they were religiously set apart, they became the victims of prejudice.

The Christians, who were religious universalists and professed a faith that transcended all religions by a claim to truth that rendered other faiths untrue, were not recognized in the same way as the Jews were. When they refused to worship both Christ and Caesar, they were persecuted as enemies of the human race. From the reign of the Emperor Decius (which began in 248 when the millenial anniversary of the founding of Rome was celebrated), they were treated as outlaws who were said to endanger the very existence of the Roman state. But, after Constantine's "conversion," Christianity became the privileged religion of the Empire and, by the decree of the Emperor Theodosius in 378 it was made the official religion of the state. From then on, the insistence upon religious uniformity with the Christians was just as rigorous as it had been when the Christians were persecuted because of their non-conformity.

The founders of the medieval European national states followed the example of the ancients. They adopted Christianity as the official religion of their realms with the expectation thus to secure political unity. The Roman Catholic Church, which was organized according to the pattern of the Roman Empire and regarded itself—not without justification—as the heir and successor of Christian Roman imperialism, encouraged these tendencies. By the coronation of Charlemagne at the hands of Pope Leo III on Christmas Day, 800, the Holy Roman Empire was founded and the Roman Catholic uniformity of the German Empire was thus established. Throughout the Middle Ages, church and state co-operated in the maintenance of this uniformity, despite the fact that the popes and emperors were often in conflict with one another about their respective authority in Christendom and about the control of the church. Nonconformists were ruthlessly oppressed by ecclesiastical and political The Jews were tolerated as a non-Christian minority, but they were ostracised by being compelled to live apart from the Christians and did not enjoy political and civil privileges. When the towns and cities came into being, they were restricted to the ghettos. Popular resentment was easily aroused against them. Again and again they were the victims of persecution and of forcible conversion.

One of the greatest crimes was the doubt of the fundament-

al Christian dogmas. Such heresy was punishable by the severest of all penalties inflicted upon criminals—execution by being burned alive. When, in the late Middle Ages, anti-Trinitarianism made its appearance, it was regarded as atheism. As such, it was held to be the most dangerous of public crimes, because it implied that the foundation of the Christian religion and therefore the basis of the unity of Christian society and of its moral law and order were untrue. This opinion has exerted its influence even upon modern society. A wide-spread prejudice against the Unitarians is attributable to it. Moreover, the profession of atheism is still widely regarded as an act not only of religious but also of civil significance. Until comparatively recent times, an atheist could not serve as a witness in the courts because he could not swear an oath to God. The background of all this is the old tradition that religion, and specifically the Christian religion, is the guarantee of social unity. It is for the same reason, that anti-Semitism can again and again become a threat to the peace of society. In its modern form, it is fed by many springs of prejudice originating in historical, cultural and particularly economic judgments and attitudes of a great variety, but its deepest source is still the tradition that Christian uniformity is the basis of public concord. This tradition has long lost its actual validity, but its authority nevertheless persists in the subconsciousness of society.

Medieval religious uniformity received its death blow at the time of the Reformation. Although it was not the intention of the Reformers to destroy the unity of Christendom, they actually did so. A variety of Christian churches came into being. Even then the practice of religious intolerance persisted and primarily for social and political reasons. Because they themselves had to suffer persecution and public condemnation of various kinds and because they represented minorities in Christendom, the Reformers re-asserted the principle (which had never been absent from the Christian consciousness but had never been made the basis of social action) that faith cannot be coerced. Thus they came to advocate religious tolerance. But, actually, they found no way of practicing it. For the conviction still generally persisted that a state must be ordered in religious uniformity. The states and communities in which the Reformation had been introduced were therefore unified by means of the Protestant creeds and by the principle "cuius regio, eius religio,"

according to which the confession of the ruler determined the religious and creedal allegiance of his subjects. Non-conformity was not tolerated. Those who found themselves unable to accept the faith of the commonwealth were given the privilege of emigration (this was the only method of granting tolerance then deemed practicable). If they refused to avail themselves of it and persisted in the open and public profession of their non-conformist faith, they were treated as disturbers of the peace and seditionists. Political considerations demanded the adherence to the laws of religious uniformity and conformity.

But the fact that the terms of the Peace of Augsburg which concluded the conflicts of the German Evangelical estates with the Holy Roman Emperor and his Roman Catholic allies, provided for legal parity between the Roman Catholic and Evangelical territories of the German Empire, demonstrated the impossibility of absolute religious uniformity. A wedge had been driven into the old tradition. It was inevitable that it would break down more and more. One after the other of the European states was forced to acknowledge the actually prevailing variety of different Christian confessions by the proclamation of Acts of Tolerance and other laws. Efforts to restore the old order caused the international conflict of the Thirty Years' War or plunged individual states into civil wars; but the confessional multiformity of Europe as a whole and of its individual states could not be undone. Where economic prosperity assured political peace and allowed for a magnanimous treatment of individual tastes and opinions (in seventeenth century Holland, for example), or where economic interests were foremost (in the founding of the colony of Maryland by the Roman Catholic Lord Calvert, for instance), the practice of tolerance was frankly encouraged.

In the meantime, the advocacy of tolerance by non-conformist minorities and by Protestant radicals who developed a new understanding of the religious life under the influence of the Reformation, humanism, and mysticism began to work a change in the general atmosphere of religion. Their point of view was supported by the mood of fatigue that followed upon the religious wars of the seventeenth century. Soon thereafter, the traditions of theological orthodoxy as they had been fostered by the various church groups, were criticized with ever increasing effectiveness by the rationalist and empirical philosophies which

arose under the impact of the humanistic and scientific impetus of the Renaissance. Ecclesiastical authoritarianism in all forms was more and more discredited. The application of reason and experiment to human experience resulted in the new understanding of the world by ratural science and history. The Age of the Enlightenment dawned. Men declared their emancipation from the authorities and traditions of the past in the name of reason. They desired to accomplish rational autonomy in all cultural endeavors. In the American and French Revolutions these tendencies came to a dramatic expression. The political independence which was then achieved entailed also religious freedom. The influence of these revolutions upon the whole Western world led gradually to the abolition of the historical traditions of uniformity everywhere.

The Constitution of the United States declared religious liberty primarily on the basis of the humanistic faith which inspired the making of American democracy. The fundamental human rights which were established in the founding of the republic implied that no religious test or profession should be made the conditions of citizenship. This principle led also to the separation of church and state. In some colonies it had already been established previously to the Revolution, but in other states of the new union, notably in New England, it was introduced only in the nineteenth century and, indirectly at least, under the impact of the Constitution.

Nevertheless, the founding fathers recognized that the republic of the United States was a Christian nation and they did not intend to change this character. One reason why they specifically provided for the separation between church and state was that only by such a separation they could deal justly with the many Christian denominations organized in America, as none could be given legal preference to another. Thus the fact of Christian multiformity was officially acknowledged and the old principle of religious uniformity was abolished.

In the course of the nineteenth century, constitutional government was established in all major states of the West. Many of the principles of freedom, first realized in the American Constitution, were then introduced into practice. Foremost among them was the principle of religious freedom. Conformity with Christian creeds and confessions and religious uniformity ceased to be political requirements. Some churches continued to enjoy

a privileged status, largely on account of the power of the historical national traditions which they represented, but the citizens were granted religious freedom. The Jews were finally

emancipated and received civil rights.

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What happened was that the modern state declared itself The importance of this event cannot be religiously neutral. overestimated. For it meant that the basis of political unity ceased to be religious. To be sure, in most nations the older tradition did not cease to be effective. Most western countries continued to regard themselves as Christian nations—and they still do. But ever increasingly they tended to maintain unity by the appeal to non-religious principles. The outstanding one was the purely political one of preserving the sovereignty of the state, i.e., to maintain and, if possible, to increase its internal and external power. In practice, appeal to this principle had the effect that the state granted freedom to all activities of the citizens which did not interfere or conflict with the raison d'état. In its relation to the churches and the religious groups, the state tended to encourage them to contribute to the stability of public morale, but it brooked no disregard of its sovereignty for re-In effect, therefore, its religious neutrality ligious reasons. amounted to the abandonment of the traditional principle of securing political unity by religious conformity.

The need of social unity as the basis of political action continued to prevail, of course. It had to be met by new means. In most cases, nationalism took the place of religious uniformity and became a very potent force of social control. It was developed by a subtle cultivation of national history. The historical traditions of a nation or people, brought to light and kept alive by modern historical research, were blended with the political ambitions of the rulers and the dominating political parties. Thus linked to history and constantly fed by historical study and writing as well as by the public celebration of the anniversaries of the great events of national history, western nationalism took the place of the older religious basis of social solidarity. It absorbed a great part of the Christian tradition. In fact, in most countries a "Christian nationalism" was permitted to develop. In the debates which accompanied the rivalry of the modern nations, the claims made in the name of this Christian nationalism were often challenged, but in the life of the individual nations the incongruity of the combination of Christian traditions and nationalist ambitions was seldom found to

be disturbing. It is significant that this form of nationalism developed particularly in the predominantly Protestant countries. It found an entrance also into the life of the United States, although here it derived its strength from the "democratic faith," in which Christian and secular beliefs were blended, rather than from the Christian churches and their particular tradition. By virtue of this fact, American nationalism is strongly inbred with the spirit of democratic universalism and humanistic idealism.

At the present moment, the phenomenon of nationalism and of "Christian nationalism" in particular is found to be very disturbing all over the western world. For, in Germany, the Nazis fostered a nationalism for the purpose of sanctioning their aims of conquest and domination which they declared to be an end in itself. They endeavored to transform German nationalism into a religiousness which was to challenge all other religious faiths. They absolutized the nation and demanded that it be worshipped as a divine reality. Thereby they brought to the surface the ultimate implications of the modern principle of the sovereignty of the national state. Although, at first, they expected to deceive the churches concerning their true intentions, even hoping that the Christian forces of Germany could be made subservient to National-Socialist totalitarianism, they were finally forced (mostly by the resistance of the churches to the idolatry which the Nazi party imposed upon the German nation) to declare openly the irreconcilability of National Socialism and Christianity. Thus they compelled their opponents, not only in Germany but everywhere in the world, to a reconsideration of the nature of the social unity that must be presupposed in political action. The war against the Nazis was undertaken primarily in national self-defense and in the name of universal democratic rights. It aroused the nationalism of the various nations to a new pitch, thus forcing them into an absolutism of national sovereignty which, although different in kind from Nazi totalitarianism, was very similar to it in spirit. In the case of Great Britain and the United States, this nationalism was greatly tempered by the devotion to the cause of democracy and the defense of its freedoms. According to frequent statements of their leaders, they fought the war as "Christian" nations. This appeal to "Christian nationalism" was intended to arouse the memory of the Christian foundations of all national cultures in contrast to the Nazis' denial of them, but it referred primarily to the democratic faith which was largely identified with Chris-

tianity. The churches responded to this appeal only reluctantly. In the British countries and in America, they did not hestitate to declare that the defense of democracy was indeed their major concern, but they refused to admit that the public spirit on which the governments relied for the successful pursuit of the wareffort should be identified with the Christian faith. Thus they have been brought face to face with the question what part they must play in public life in view of the fact that Christian uniformity is no longer a requirement of citizenship and the basis of the exercise of political responsibility, while at the same time the drive for social unity in every political community is stronger than it ever was. This question cannot be answered without a consideration of the churches' reaction to the establishment of religious freedom (or tolerance) in the modern political world.

We have seen that the separation of the church from the state was primarily due to the initiative of the modern state and not of the church. To be sure, it could not have been effected without the strong influence of tendencies in the church that pointed to such a separation. Furthermore, the actual conditions of divisiveness within the churches made it inevitable that the freedom of religion was declared in connection with the establishment of the democratic state. But the major churches themselves did not exercise any really significant leadership in order to bring all this about. Only the Protestant minority groups greeted and hailed the establishment of religious tolerance because it ended the long struggle for freedom in which they had been engaged either in defense of religious principles or on account of their minority position.

Thus it came about that the churches were compelled to adjust themselves to the accomplished fact of the freedom of religion. They were drawn into a complicated process of change and reinterpretation which has been going on for almost two centuries and is still shaping their lives.

Generally speaking, the churches related themselves to the new situation by a new concept of the church in which the independence of the church is asserted over against the independency of the state. It involves the abandonment of the attempt to maintain a unified church and it also entails the mutual recognition by the churches of one another's rights to exist. Denominationalism thus became the answer of Protestantism to the secularization of the state. In the work of the formulation of

a church concept adequate to this change, the teachings of Humanists, Spiritualists, Anabaptists, and other sectarians proved to be most effective. These groups which had been exposed to the intolerance of the major church groups thus were given an influence upon the mind of modern Christianity of which their founders could never have dreamed. The modern churches ceased to define themselves as God-ordered institutions of salvation. To be sure, many of them preserved the theological-ecclesiological traditions of the ancient church, of Catholicism. and of classical Protestantism. But, practically, these teachings lost their effectiveness. In agreement with the practice which the churches came to follow in the exercise of their function within the modern political and social community, a church was defined as a "religious corporation or association," represented first by local congregations and then by the organization of these in larger units. The theory of John Locke, definitely inspired by English Independentism, furnished the pattern—not in the sense that Locke directly determined the new interpretation of the church but rather in the sense that the principle which he was one of the first to articulate was actually adopted as the point of departure by all who concerned themselves with the formulation and the enactment of the new concept of the church. In his "Letters Concerning Toleration," he had written:

"A church then I take to be a voluntary Society of Men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to worship God publicly in such a manner as they judge acceptable to

him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls."

Under the impact of the development of thus defined "free churches," the meaning of the article in the Apostles' Creed which speaks of the "one, holy, catholic church" was more and more transformed. Protestantism all over the world learned from America to refer to "churches" rather than to "the church." The concept of "the church" ceased to be the *norm* which must be applied to the various responses of Christian people to the *one* divine call through Jesus Christ. It became an *ideal* to which the various human historical manifestations of the Christian spirit in the world are to conform in the course of time.

The secularization of the state, i.e., its abandonment of the principle of religious uniformity as the basis of social unity, thus

1. Works V. 19. See my article on "The Nature of Protestantism" in this Journal.

¹ Works V, 19. See my article on "The Nature of Protestantism" in this Journal, vol. VI (1937), 21f., also the article by Robert H. Nichols on "The Influence of the American Environment on the Conception of the Church," ibid., vol. XI (1942), 181ff.

produced a humanization of the church. In the periods prior to the modern world, the state had been confronted by a church which understood itself as an institution of supernatural origin set into the world by the divine revelation in Jesus Christ. Today, it is facing a church which interprets itself as the social embodiment of the Christian spirit which, since the days of Jesus of Nazareth, has inspired men to the quest of the good life as

Iesus taught and lived it.

The development of this church idea was very gradual and also very complicated, for it occurred in the context of the formation of so-called liberal theology. Indeed, it was one part of that radical re-thinking of the nature and truth of religion which was undertaken by theological liberalism. Under the influence of modern philosophy and science and, generally, of the spirit of modern civilization, the theologians were driven to criticize the norms by which the truth of Christianity had been traditionally affirmed. They showed that the absolute normativeness of the authority of Scripture, creeds, and ecclesiastical institutions could no longer be maintained in the light of the new philosophical and scientific criteria of knowledge. Furthermore, they undertook a historical, psychological, and sociological interpretation of the Christian tradition, thereby proving that what formerly had been regarded as supernatural, divine (and therefore indubitable) revelations had to be understood in terms of a historical development subject to changing and relative human decisions. Theological orthodoxy together with all its claims for authority was thus rendered untenable.

The acceptance of the tenets of liberal theology by the churches and their people was very slow and even in this day it is by no means general, although the influence of liberalism upon the life of the churches is much deeper than is commonly acknowledged. The main reasons for the gradualness of the growth of liberalism were the conservative character of most churches and the problematical nature of liberalism itself. The faith and order of the churches depended upon old traditions which could not be undone without destroying the ecclesiastical institutions themselves. Roman Catholicism most clearly exemplifies this fear of modernism. It has consistently barred it from its life in order to preserve the pre-liberal character of its faith and order. The Protestant churches did not possess the means for such a total exclusion of the spirit of liberalism, but many of them, particularly the older ones, endeavored to keep

themselves immune from its influences. They were motivated not merely by traditionalism but also by a well-founded suspicion of the validity of the liberal interpretation of Christianity. This suspicion was often directed to the critical methods of liberal theology and to the historical understanding of Christianity which resulted therefrom. But this achievement of modern theology cannot be discredited. It must be regarded as final, although it is, of course, to be expected that, in the years to come. the historical character of the Christian religion will be further illuminated. However, the doubts that were cast upon the reinterpretation of the Christian message which liberalism claimed to derive from its treatment of Christian history were, as we now know, to a large extent justified. For liberalism tended to understand the Christian faith primarily in terms of human experience, either individual or social. On the basis of this assumption, it proceeded to relate it to the cultural ideals of modern man. Because these ideals were humanistic and inspired by the concern for freedom which had led modern man to emancipate himself from the authorities which he believed had been superimposed upon the life of his predecessors, Christianity was seen as an ally of the cause of human autonomy. But the fact is that while the heteronomous character of medieval Catholicism and of orthodox Protestantism cannot be defended as of the essence of the Christian faith itself, the interpretation of the Christian gospel in terms of human autonomy is also untenable. For the Christian gospel is not reconcilable either with a heteronomous authoritarianism or with an autonomous liberalism. It is truly seen only by a prophetic apprehension which sees that the fulfilment of human life and the release of its true possibilities originate in the grace of God. This prophetic understanding of Christianity, according to which the freedom of man is grounded in obedience to God, may be called theonomous. As history shows, this prophetic Christian faith is capable of an alliance with the autonomous criticisms of all heteronomous authoritarianism but it is also able to align itself with those movements and tendencies that resist the interpretations of religion in terms of human autonomy. By virtue of this character of Christianity, the churches were able, in modern times, both to permit the criticism of their orthodox, authoritarian traditions in the name of liberalism and to preserve these traditions in selfdefense against a humanistic misinterpretation of their faith. With the help of this orientation, they may best be able to come to terms with the situation that is provided for them by the freedom of religion. For they may be enabled by it to avoid the practice of intolerance, which is quite irreconcilable with the spirit of democracy and, at the same time, they can steer clear of an attitude of tolerance which would render the demand for obedience to the lordship of God irrelevant. For a prophetic Christianity does not need to bind itself to certain historical forms of faith and order—to this extent it encourages the liberal criticism of historical traditions; but it must remain subject to the word of God—to this extent it must be subject to an authority which transcends all human apprehensions of it and is therefore not open to the change of human opinions.

In a society to whose members freedom of religion is guaranteed, there is no room for religious and ecclesiastical intolerance. If it is nevertheless practiced, either religious liberty or the religious body will ultimately be destroyed.

Roman Catholicism still preserves its old traditions and is therefore, in principle, intolerant. In countries where it possesses the following of a clear majority of the citizens (as for example, in some South American republics) it therefore prevents the full observance of religious liberty. In states where it represents a minority of the citizens, it is exposed to forces which constantly threaten its authoritarian claims. There it endeavors to protect itself from the pressures of change that inhere in democratic life by avoiding in the name of religion co-operation with other religious bodies. But this religious isolationism is impossible in the long run. Various Protestant groups have had this experience. They tried to keep themselves immune from the impact of religious liberty upon their life by holding tenaciously to their traditions and by avoiding a cooperative encounter with other denominations. But they have found that it is impossible to stay aloof from the democratic environment in which religious liberty thrives. They were compelled not merely to claim the benefits of the freedom of religion for themselves but to acknowledge that these benefits belong also to other groups. Thus they were led to relate themselves to them.

The establishment of religious liberty makes for denominationalism but also for interdenominationalism. On the one hand, it encourages religious divisiveness, because every religious group is given the opportunity freely to develop itself. Yet on the other hand, it puts the various religious movements

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into such a proximity, to one another that an exchange, not only of members but also of work in a common cause, become inevitable. Such has been the experience of the Protestant churches in the United States. Religious liberty has fostered the divisiveness of American Protestantism. There now exists among us a pluralism of churches each pursuing its own course and engaging in a rivalry with other churches. Many of them are on principle intolerant toward one another and only live up to the rules of religious liberty by reducing the tendencies of intolerance to such an extent that their relationship with other groups is that of a truce between combatants. But, at the same time. there has grown up a spirit of co-operation between American churches which has found very concrete expression in common enterprises. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, to which most large denominations belong, is the chief exponent of this interdenominationalism. It encourages a constant collaboration of the churches in practical church work. Moreover its influence upon the common life is such that it represents the unity of Protestantism in the very midst of its divisiveness. Its power will grow in the years that lie ahead. The churches will more and more relate themselves to one another not only in co-operative enterprises but also in mutual interpenetration. During the past decades, many unions of church bodies have taken place. Old divisions of denominational families have been healed by reunion and new bodies of churches have been created by the merger of denominations of similar background and outlook. This process will probably grow in extent. However, one must recognize that the historical differences between the major church groups are such that they cannot all be united with one another. It is not even desirable that they should form one single body. But under the power of the interrelationship which religious liberty makes possible they will increasingly learn not to absolutize their respective historical differences but to expose themselves to one another out of the awareness that each in its own way bears witness to the same religious message of salvation. Thus they will come to recognize the relative nature of the differences that separate them from each other. In this connection the spirit of liberalism will determine their lives and the modernization which has taken place in the whole of western civilization and which already has been effected in those sections of Christendom that have opened themselves to liberalism will envelop all of its parts. At this moment it is inconceivable that Roman Catholicism can be drawn into this process, but we may expect Protestantism to be shaped by it more and more thoroughly.

If this anticipation is correct, it will be of utmost importance that the spirit of prophetic Christianity be kept alive. For the danger will arise that the reduction or the relativization of the differences between the Protestant groups will promote an attitude of indifference toward the distinctive character of the Christian faith. Such an attitude is now already widespread among the large number of those who have become alienated from the churches, chiefly under the influence of modern secular education and of modern secular philosophies of life. Many church members, particularly those of the so-called intelligentsia, have been affected by the same mood.

Indifference and religious faith exclude each other. therefore, the broadening of outlook which the practice of tolerance induces, because it stimulates the desire of mutual understanding, should lead to religious indifference, the churches would They would not only lose their identity, but they would also be deprived of the strength that alone can keep them alive, namely a faith that knows what it is committed to. A commitment to God involving an absolute allegiance which nevertheless allows for the recognition of the relative character of religious practices, is implied in that Christian faith which we have called prophetic or theonomous. Such a faith is aware of the fragmentary nature and the inadequacy of all human apprehensions of God, but is upheld by a power that is derived from the divine itself. It expresses itself in the spirit of repentance, i.e., in the willingness of the believer not only to seek renewal from God but also to rethink and to reform all the wavs by which he is obedient to God's will. Prophetic Christianity relativizes the forms of the Christian life out of the concern for the lordship. the sovereignty of God. It, therefore, calls for a religious reformation inspired by the concern for the purity of the gospel.

The norms by which this purity can be achieved are out of the reach of human decisions or decrees. They have to be furnished by the divine inspiration which breaks and shatters all arbitrary human absolutizations and which possesses only the men of humility.

We thus come to the conclusion that the establishment of religious liberty in modern democracy is offering to the churches the opportunity to realize what the Reformation movements of Christian history intended: the liberation of the gospel of God from the incrustations of human traditions. As long as religious uniformity was regarded as the precondition of social political unity, a full religious reformation in this sense was actually impossible. But freedom of religion has opened the doors not only to tolerance of men toward one another but also to the work of a reformation of the churches by an unencumbered obedience to the word of God.

If the churches will learn to respond to this challenge of prophetic Christianity, they will experience an increase in spiritual power that will exceed the strength they once enjoyed by virtue of the practice of religious conformity and uniformity. It will also enable them to inspire democracy with the resources by means of which a true community of free men can be built.

The opportunity that is offered to the American churches is tremendous. If they avail themselves of the benefits which democracy has bestowed upon them and if they fulfil the obligations toward democracy which the Christian gospel imposes upon them, they will be able to open to European Christendom the vision toward a Christian social order for which it longs, and they will deepen the American democratic faith—perhaps with the help of the Christian spirit which the Europeans have rediscovered during the war years, so that the freedom of democracy may be extended into all realms of human endeavor.

BOOK REVIEWS

LIGHT FROM THE ANCIENT PAST

THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND OF THE HEBREW-CHRISTIAN RELIGION
By Jack Finegan. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. 500
pages. \$5.00.

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This book is conceived on the grand scale. It begins with remote prehistoric beginnings in Mesopotamia and Egypt, moves on in the path of
the great empires through the life and culture of the ancient world, taking
Israel in its stride, and at length in the long course of the centuries comes
to the Roman power as the setting for Christian origins. Then the church
is followed in its expansion to the triumphant days of Constantine; indeed the account of Christian edifices looks down the ages even to the sixteenth century A.D. It is a generous tableau of history and religious
archaeology, for which the book's five hundred pages are none too much.
Yet it is to the credit of the author that he moves among this immensity
without sense of hurry or confusion. The generous worth of the book is
much enhanced by its beautifully reproduced photographic illustrations—
there are 204 of them, of varying sizes from one-third to full page. In
addition the text is illumined with several maps and plans, and with small
photographic cuts as chapter headings.

Yet this summary presents only the least significant feature of the volume. Its importance inheres in its excellence. Finegan seems as much at home in discussion of the churches of Rome and western Europe as in the prehistoric archaeology of hither Asia. And everywhere he manifests a competent familiarity with movements of history, with archaeological facts and finds, and with the literature of the specific matter in hand. It will thus be evident that the author has interpreted the scope of Biblical archaeology in generous terms. Here is no scant listing of "parallels" and "proofs" of Biblical passages, but a survey of the whole cultural and historic matrix of the Hebrew-Christian movement and literature, which for its complete understanding compels a survey of beginnings and development as well. Yet the Biblical relevance, while not obtruded, is never lost from sight. The sketch of the Pyramid Age-surely remote from the Bible story—leads on to consideration of the wisdom of Ptahhotep, cited as "the earliest formulations of right conduct to be found in any literature." Out of the Middle Kingdom came the Tale of Sinuhe, summarized as "tangible evidence of communication between Egypt and Palestine and Syria in these very early days." However, the reader may feel at this point that the author lost a valuable opportunity when he did not point out as well the similarities of the story to that of Moses' flight to Midian.

Of the first-rate importance of Finegan's book it is unnecessary to say more. In recent years there have appeared a number of excellent accounts of Biblical archaeology, in whole or in part, but none are of this scope. The book is certain to be a standard for many years to come. And

as new results of investigations supersede the presentation here given, doubtless the book will be kept up to date in succeeding editions. As a contribution to that more perfect work a few of the minor points which he might well consider are here drawn to the author's attention.

On page 47 the dates of Hammurabi are given as 1728-1676. This latter figure is some sort of slip for 1686; there can be no dispute as to the forty-three year limit of Hammurabi's reign. A mistake of a different sort occurs on pages 60-61. Finegan argues through to the date 1935 B.C. as suitable for Abraham's migration to Canaan; then he goes on, "Interestingly enough, 'Abraham' occurs as a personal name about this time in Babylonia. A clay tablet from the reign of Ammi-zaduga deals with the hiring of an ox by a certain Abarama. . ." But Ammi-zaduga was the last but one of the kings of the First Dynasty, whose accession, by Finegan's accepted chronology, cannot be dated before 1602 B.C. A lapse of three centuries leaves one still in "about" the same time only by an excessive foreshortening of history. And incidentally even Finegan's cautious presentation of his date for Abraham, to which he reverts on page 81, attaches to it greater credence than it deserves. On this latter page also, it would have been of value to mention the available evidence for some sort of Egyptian political influence in Palestine in the Middle Kingdom (cf. J. A. Wilson in AJSL 58, 225-236). The problem of the Habiru-Apiru would have received some measure of illumination by reference to the series of articles in AJSL 49 (1933) and to S. I. Feigin's Missitrei Heavar, Part II, in particular the essay 'Ivrim-'Asirim?', on pages 281-283. The alleged monotheism of Akhenaton is quite overdone (95). Gaster's essay on "Divine Kingship in the Ancient Near East" (Review of Religion. March, 1945) presents a very proper corrective to the easy equation of ancient and modern religious ideas such as has too long confused our understanding of Akhenaton's religion. (See also J. A. Wilson in the forthcoming Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man, University of Chicago Press, 1946). It is a comparable exaggeration to say that "the prophetic works of the Hebrews are connected intimately with Egyptian literature" (p. 116). The adverb "remotely" would have made the claim more truthful. A serious lack is the failure to mention the prophetic frenzy related in the story of Wenamon (109). One of the worst errors that Finegan has perpetrated, however, is his guileless acceptance of Wooley's claim of having found in the lower levels of Ur evidences of the Flood. And the situation is the more astonishing since by Finegan's own account the matter is ludicrous. On pages 23-24 he tells the familiar story as Wooley himself relates it: the excavation went down through remains of human occupation into sterile earth, and below eight feet of this it came again upon archaeological materials; the sterile stratum was laid down by the Flood. But it is apparent that if that depth of clay was laid down in the course of of the one year claimed by the Biblical story, we deal not with a flood but with a landslide! Yet observe the facts which Finegan innocently relates: the remains just above this layer of clay were "later Obeid forms," but immediately below the material was such as occurred "in the earliest levels at Tell el-Obeid." That is, the clay was slowly deposited during almost the entirety of the Obeid period. And by the calculation which Finegan accepts (17-18) this covered about a thousand years—a rather lengthy

extension of the time of the Biblical Flood! In the name of all that is rational let us bury Wooley's flood finally and forever in the hole where he found it.

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William A. Irwin.

VILLES MORTES DE HAUTE SYRIE

Par Joseph Mattern, S. J. Seconde édition. Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique, 1944. 192 pages, 60 pl., 40 figs. incl. maps.

P. Mattern's book, the first edition of which (1933) has long been out of print, is the most convenient survey of the architecture and civilization of the hundred-odd "dead cities" which lie in the rectangle bounded by Antioch, Apamea, Chalcis and Beroea. These cities, which flourished in a rich agricultural region from the second to the seventh centuries of our era, now stand, in many cases nearly intact, in a desert produced by complete deforestation.

The sites have been published in detail by De Vogüé and Butler. P. Mattern's work, based on his own visits to the region, provides a more rapid survey and adds important new material. The second edition has been revised and considerably enlarged. Many photographs and plans, including valuable aerial photographs, have been added. Several previously unpublished sites are described, and there is a new chapter on the two churches (one containing the famous prophlyactic mosaic) of Deir Solaib.

Of particular interest to the readers of this journal is the report (90-95) of the discovery near Kfar Derian of the enclosure and pillar of the stylite John, who has hitherto been known only from a reference in a Syriac MS. in the British Museum. There is also a new hypothesis (79-81) concerning the use of the towers such as are found at Qasr el-Banat by female religious recluses.

While the book is primarily concerned with architecture, every student of any aspect of the history of Syria during this period will profit from P. Mattern's work.

Harvard University Dumbarton Oaks Research Library Washington, D. C.

Glanville Downey.

THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD BY ST. ATHANASIUS

Translated by A Religious of C.S.M.V.S. Th. Introduction by C. S. Lewis. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946. 96 pages. \$1.50.

The treatise of which *The Incarnation of the Word of God* forms the second half was written by Athanasius in his twenty-first year, when the Christian Church was moving, almost unwittingly, into the most momentous crisis it had hitherto encountered. Christianity was no longer an "unlicensed cult," but Constantine was not yet sole Emperor and the embarrassment of riches which was to flow from his imperial favor had scarcely

begun to complicate the counsels of the Church. The Arian controversy was just on the verge of breaking out but there was, at the moment, a doctrinal calm in the Church which would not last long and would not return in Athanasius' lifetime. The author of this treatise Contra Gentes is not the familiar "Athanasius contra mundum," defender of the faith and defier of Emperors. He is, rather, the Christian apologist, direct successor to Justin, Clement and Origen. He writes to convince a friend of his, apparently but lately come within the orbit of Christian faith and ideas, first. that paganism is bankrupt both intellectually and morally and, second, that the Christian affirmations about the Incarnate Word are the truest and most intelligible clues to the mystery of God's redemptive love and purpose. He is able to assume that Macarius has a rudimentary understanding of and commitment to the Christian truth. With this as background. the young Christian teacher attempts to lead the Christian initiate, by easy stages, from simple faith to rational conviction. He makes plain his own awareness that the Christian story begins and ends in mystery, but he is equally positive that the mystery is not specifically irrational and that it is both the right and duty of the devout mind to inquire in the temple of God,

This sort of fides quaerens intellectum is in a familiar ante-Nicene pattern. There is the same firm grasp of the essential core of the Gospel, the same freedom in experimenting with variations on the dominant theme. There is the same brilliant use of analogy as a valid form of theological insight, the same strong emphasis upon the practical success which Christianity has had in displacing pagan idolatry and in exhibiting the fruits of the Spirit in the lives of the Christian faithful. There is the same almost blithe confidence in the victorious destiny of the Christian Church. However, one interesting difference of nuance between Athanasius and his fore-runners is to be seen in their respective attitudes toward the Church's temporal fortunes. For the earlier apologists, Christianity was a struggling, persecuted religious minority in the Roman Empire; hence, their expected triumph of the Kingdom lies beyond the scheduled end of history. Athanasius can himself bear witness to some very solid progress of the Church in the world and he feels he can celebrate Christ as Victor even here and now.

The whole treatise, but more especially The Incarnation of the Word, is a Christian classic and it is always a happy event to have such a treasure of the Christian legacy made available to us in modern English dress. This translation, by a member of the Congregation of St. Mary the Virgin, is a very welcome addition to our resources for recovering the mind and faith of a great Christian theologian. It is a good translation, more readable and in a far more natural English idiom than Archibald Robertson's, which is the best we have had hitherto. As for its faithfulness to the original, in the random samples which this reviewer tested no major distortions of essential meanings were noted, although there were the usual number of minor points about which questions could be raised (for example, can "pronoia" be rendered "Mind" without evoking dubious connotations from modern philosophical idealism?). Only purists will deny that, in order to turn patristic Greek into English equivalently clear and cogent, one must have liberty in translation and occasional license to paraphrase. In this case, such liberty has been exercised judiciously. In

short, this is a useful book to put into the hands of the student or layman who, by some happy magic, has been made to desire to whet his mind and test his heart against an old Christian classic which still has

power to speak to the condition of modern men.

The teacher of church history or historical theology, however, may regret the decision of the translator to ignore the first half of the treatise, Contra Gentes. It is true that the details of Athanasius' attempted refutation of pagan idolatry and the exposé of the bankruptcy of pagan faith and life are dated; one agrees that there is less directly relevant material there for the modern reader than in the positive affirmations of The Incarnation. On the other hand, The Refutation of the Pagans is quite as important for the understanding of Athanasius' theological method and intent as the greater sequel which mounts the further steps of faith and vision. There are perennially important ideas in the Contra Gentes and it is unfortunate that the very type of reader who will profit most from the contemporaneous flavour of this new translation will not have before him an equally fresh and incisive English version of its prolegomena.

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Albert C. Outler.

A HISTORY OF ARMENIAN CHRISTIANITY FROM THE BEGINNING TO OUR OWN TIMES

By Leon Arpee. New York: The Armenian Missionary Association of America, Inc. 386 pages.

It is very significant that in the year in which the Armenian Evangelicals are celebrating their one hundredth anniversary they should publish A History of Armenian Christianity, primarily dealing with the history of their Mother Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, from which they broke away in 1846. The author, Dr. Leon Arpee, has spared himself no pains to present in an objective, detached and sympathetic—nay even devoted—manner the history of the church from which his own ancestors were forced out. Such a book has been long overdue. Ormanian's monumental work, even in its one volume English translation, has been for years unobtainable. The author also makes his readers his debtors by supplying material generally inaccessible, like excerpts from the translation of the Scriptures into Armenian, and gems of Armenian theological and devotional literature both in the text (chapters VI and XIII) and in the appendix.

After a brief treatment of the pre-Christian religion of Armenia the author discusses the beginnings of the Armenian Church. Discarding its apostolic origin as legendary, he goes on to offer convincing evidence that the early Christianity of the Armenians was anything but orthodox. Unmistakably it was a form of Adoptionism, a fact which, according to Dr. Arpee, explains why Armenian Orthodox writers studiously ignore the earlier Christianity of their country. Indeed, heresy seems to have been perennial in Armenia, under one form or another, but especially as one of the several varieties of Paulicianism. Orthodox Trinitarian Christianity became the religion of Armenia in the days of St. Gregory the Illuminator

in 301 A.D. Thus Armenia, under King Tiridates, was the first country to make Christianity the religion of the state. But real Christianization did not begin until fully a century later, largely due to the efforts of Catholicos Nerces the Great, his son, Catholicos Isaac, and the scholar Mesrop. Through the invention of the Armenian alphabet, through the monumental translation of the Scriptures into the vernacular, and through other efforts for the Christian education of the people, the last two outstanding figures brought Christianity closer to them.

The book gives a very fair account of the relations of the Armenian Church with the Greek and of the separation of the two churches over the issue of monophysitism. The discussion of Armenian monophysitism points to the fact that the Christology of that Church, despite its protests against Chalcedon, and despite the inclusion of the Theopaschite phrase "Who was crucified for us" in the Trisaghion, is not very different from that of the Fourth Ecumenical Council. The real fear of the Armenian ecclesiastics of that day came from their suspicion that Chalcedon had departed from the Third Ecumenical Council and had endorsed the Nestorian teachings of the two natures in Christ. Strangely enough the author does not mention the fact that one of the difficulties was due to the absence of the right word in the Aremenian theological vocabulary of the times. The Armenians had the same word, Pnuthiun, for both Nature and Person, and the Chalcedonian formula of Two Natures in One Person, made absolutely no sense when translated as "two Pnuthiuns in one Pnuthiun"! The subsequent history of the Armenian Church deals with events down to the present time, including dealings with the Crusaders, the Roman Catholic efforts to win the Armenians, the activities and the results of Protestant missionaries, and the terrible massacres during the first world war.

As presented by the author the history of the Armenian Church from its earliest beginnings to the present is one sad tale of conflicts with the adherents of heresies, Zoroastrianism, Greek Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Islam and Protestantism. Time and again either for the sake of self-preservation or in the interests of Christian peace, the Armenian Church was willing to compromise its faith and accept positions held by Greeks or Latins. Mutual suspicion also repeatedly made it impossible for brother Christians to unite against common enemies. As if religious conflicts were not enough, Armenia, situated in the paths of empires, uninterruptedly suffered as a buffer state among Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Seldjuks, Turks, Tartars, Mongols, Russians, to say nothing of representatives of the Christian West. The Armenians had now to side with the one and now to offer their services to the other, ever appealing for protection to some outside patron and always bringing new misfortunes upon themselves. As this tragedy unfolds and as the Church acts as the chief agency to keep the people alive, one has no difficulty in understanding what brought about the thorough identification of religion and nationality among the Armenians. Worse perhaps than these conflicts with rival faiths and empires and the resulting oppressions, ravages, persecutions, sufferings, massacres and bloodshed, is the tragic picture of endless rivalries, intrigues and crimes among the Armenians themselves.

The author has dwelt excessively on the tragic fate of the Armenian Church. Thereby he unconsciously does a disservice, even an injustice, to the church of his fathers. Is there nothing in its long history to inspire, or to make one proud of achievement? With the exception of the chapter on the translation of the Bible, which Dr. Arpee considers a masterpiece, and a few words of appreciation of the Armenian character as a product of Armenian Christianity, there is little to bring out any glorious aspects. Even the epic of Vartan is treated in a matter-of-fact way. After all, a type of Christianity which survived in spite of most bitter persecutions for so many centuries must have elements of strength. The book distinctly lacks in appreciation of this aspect of Armenian Christianity.

In his efforts to pack into this volume as many details as possible the author has at many points reduced a living history to a monotonous chronicle of names, dates and places. On the other hand a definite weakness is the absence of maps. Without them even one familiar with the Near East finds it impossible to follow the kaleidoscopic changes in the life of the Armenian Church. A tendency to use Latin terms in describing Armenian practices should have been avoided. The author is of course familiar with the fact that only Latins say mass; Greeks and Armenians celebrate the liturgy. The terms pontiff and its derivatives are exclusively reserved for the popes, and legates are only papal representatives.

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A gross historical error appears in connection with the organization and the destruction of the body of Janissaries. This body of soldiers was not started by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1535, nor was it abolished in 1676 (210). It was instituted by Sultan Orkhan (1326-1359) and was cruelly wiped out by Sultan Mahmoud II in 1826. Indeed the author who claims that the Janissaries were abolished in 1676 has them very much alive in 1819 (260), and has them massacred a few years later by Mahmoud II (261). A few other minor errors might be mentioned. A typographical slip changed "affliction" into "affection" on p. 237. The Peace of Adrianople following the Russo-Turkish War of 1828-29 did not liberate the Greeks. The Anglo-French beat the Russians to that game through the London Protocols. Nor were there only 400,000 Greeks liberated on that occasion (293), but at least twice as many. The American Board did not liquidate its interests nor did it withdraw from Turkey following the First World War (292). Though its activities were seriously curtailed, it is still carrying on considerable work in that country. The position of the author would be stronger if the sources of the telegrams ordering the massacre of the Armenians were given on p. 300. One wonders why the flourishing Evangelical church of Aintab is so ignored or possibly misrepresented, as on p. 283, and why Bezjian of Aintab, an outstanding figure among the Protestant Armenians, who became the head of the Protestant Millet in Turkey, is not even mentioned!

In spite of limitations the book fills a real need. In these days when efforts are made to bring the churches together, it merits a careful and wide reading.

George P. Michaelides.

ABBOT SUGER ON THE ABBEY OF ST. DENIS AND ITS ART TREASURES

By Erwin Panofsky. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. xiv, 250 pages, 26 illustrations. \$3.75.

This volume contains the carefully edited text of three pieces from Suger's writings which deal with the rebuilding and refurnishing of his famous church. A translation and a detailed commentary give an excellent interpretation of the difficult texts; a short introduction sketches a lively picture of Suger's complex and many-sided personality and points to the significance of his activities as a patron of the arts. Since the writings are edited for the benefit of the art historian, the emphasis in the interpretation is, of course, on artistic questions; in his comments Dr. Panofsky has solved a great many problems presented by these texts which have puzzled generations of scholars. The methods he uses are sound philology and historical criticism. On the other hand, he has succeeded in putting together such a comprehensive account of Suger's building activities that it should interest also the political, economical, and church historian. In painstakingly following the various leads offered by the texts, he has been able to throw light on a great many matters which have only indirectly to do with art and architecture. The result is a vivid picture of the manifold aspects of life in one of the great medieval convents. The author's attempts to tie together the different aspects of his subject are highly successful. Particularly revealing is, for instance, the observation that Suger could justify his fondness for gorgeous church decorations made of precious materials by reference to the works ascribed to Dionysius Areopagita, who was presumed to be identical with the patron saint of the church. In paying attention to the words of the churchman Suger, Dr. Panofsky has made here a real contribution to the interpretation of much of medieval art in general. In the same direction point the passages in which he writes about the not always cordial relations between Suger and Bernhard of Clairveaux. The volume contains many references to medieval inconography. Suger's choice of subjects for his gold embossed altar frontals and stained glass windows is proved to anticipate in every detail the later cycles of the Bible Moralisée, the Biblia Pauperum, the Speculum Humanae Salvationis. A short glossary makes some ingenious contributions to medieval Latin lexicography. As an example may be quoted the surprising translation of aquilo, not as "north" as we would expect, but, in the case of St. Denis as "west." Also, Dr. Panofsky's interpretation of the word circinatus, which at first is disturbing to the historian of textiles, seems to be correct. In cases of dubious readings of the text, or possible conflicting interpretations of words and passages, Dr. Panofsky is not dogmatical, and presents the case for the various possibilities with all fairness. He is also aware that he has not solved all of the many difficulties of his texts. The eminently fair scholarly attitude of its author, together with its interesting subject, makes this remarkable volume instructive and enlightening reading. To do full justice to its merits would take more space than here available. It may be added, however, that the book is produced in excellent taste and that its complex material is arranged in the simplest and clearest possible fashion.

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U. Middeldorf.

RECALLING THE SCOTTISH COVENANTS

By Hugh Watt. London and New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Limited, 1946. ix, 109 pages. 6s.

"During the last ten years," so runs the Foreword of Professor Watt of New College, Edinburgh, "commemoration has been made in Scotland of the critical events of three hundred years ago," events of the heroic age of Scottish church history marked by the Covenants. This small but solid book is a collection of papers written or read by him at these anniversaries. All rest on fresh research in the originals, which has employed some hitherto unknown or unappreciated sources. The first paper treats the history of the Canons of 1636, framed for the Church of Scotland by Laud to accompany his proposed Liturgy for the church. The most important feature of the Canons here brought out is their "uncompromising assertion of the King's supremacy in Church matters." This is emphasized by this fact: one Canon, of which Laud in 1636 wrote that it "still remains under the curtain," Professor Watt has ascertained from Laud's papers to be that which forbids National Synods to alter in any respect, ritual, doctrinal or disciplinary, the intended new constitution of the church. Hence the Canons of 1636 were "a gauntlet flung by royal despotism in the face of a Church and a people reared in a tradition of independence," a challenge accepted two years later in the National Covenant. Concerning this the second paper establishes a historical revision which undoes much rhetoric. This Covenant was not signed in Greyfriars Churchyard in a tumultuous open-air meeting, by men and women and children, some signing with their own blood, etc. It was first signed on February 28, 1643, within the church, by "nobility, greater and lesser," the next day in Tailors' Hall by ministers, and by "other delegates and visitors" on March 2. "It appears that it was not until the 1st of April that any general signing began in Edinburgh, though during March there notable scenes elsewhere." That this rewriting of the circumstances detracts nowise from the significance of the Covenant the third paper, on "Greyfriars: Tercentenary Celebration" shows, maintaining eloquently that "the crisis that called forth the Covenant was primarily a religious issue," that of the church's freedom, that "the mainspring of the resistance was religious," not national, popular refusal of royal domination of the church, that "the Covenant itself was . . . a great religious pronouncement" and the occasion of "a striking revival of religion."

Much the longest paper, on "William Laud and Scotland," is an interesting addition to a perpetual controversy, interesting especially because of its criticism of Laud's defence in his *Troubles and Tryal* by the use of his writings in cipher in the Strafford manuscripts. Professor Watt admits to having been on the more favorable side of the controversy, but his studies have brought him down emphatically on the other side. He thinks that the "puzzles contained in his (Laud's) Scottish policy" are explained out of the English situation. He had striven to establish in the Church of England "such a revision of Canons and Liturgy" as would satisfy one who desired "a return to many mediaeval practices." But the general opposition of clergy and people to this he could not overcome and for this

the king would not exert authority in England. Professor Watt points out that "the Scottish prelates who brought the original charges against Laud" accused him of a plan to establish in Scotland by royal power a form of worship to his own mind and then bring England into conformity with it, and he thinks that "this is the one explanation that seems to fit all the facts." He shows that the Liturgy proposed for Scotland, called Laud's, was indeed in its final form, contrary to many opinions, the work of Laud, not that of Scottish bishops, as he later tried to make it appear. The canon "under the curtain" was intended to fix the Liturgy by royal authority, beyond the power of the Scottish church. It is shown from the ciphers to Wentworth that Laud was dissatisfied because at the crisis over the Liturgy this authority was not used more thoroughly to reduce Scotland to "Summum bonum in England—the restoration of priestly rites and ancient values-was to come through that summum bonum attained in Scotland. It is the wreckage of this great scheme that explains Laud's bitter exasperation with the Scots." The Scottish resistance that wrecked the scheme, Professor Watt holds, was "fundamentally religious," concerned for "the elevation of the Lord's Supper in its simplicities to be the spiritual sustenance of the believing community." This is a different religious issue from that previously stated, but the two are not inconsistent.

A short fifth paper recounts the origin of the Solemn League and Covenant and contends that by its Scottish authors it was never intended to be a means of intolerance. The last paper describes the usage of the renewal of the Covenants in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, among the Cameronians and Reformed Presbyterians, in the Secession and among evangelicals of the Church of Scotland, which Professor Watt thinks not merely antiquarianism but a real force for religious renewal; and it refers to the continued insistence on the obligation of the Covenants among Reformed Presbyterians overseas. The texts of the National Covenant and the Solemn League constitute a useful appendix.

Union Theological Seminary, New York. Robert Hastings Nichols.

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF AMERICAN CATHOLICS 1634-1829

By C. J. Nuesse. Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Book Shop, 1945. x, 315 pages. \$3.00.

This excellent study fulfills virtually every requirement of the ideal monograph. The subject is significant and ably handled, filling an important gap in previous knowledge. The book is extremely well written; there are no apparent errors either of fact or typography. It was not produced in a vacuum: the author has given careful attention not only to ecclesiastical affairs but to the broad social, economic and political background of each of the periods with which he deals. If his title seems rather broad, an overwhelming proportion of his content political, and the "thought"

largely the ideas of individuals, he admits as much. The bibliographical notes are especially valuable, as they are comprehensive, well-arranged, and timely.

The first two chapters deal with the founding of the Maryland tradition of religious liberty and its short-lived practice in that colony. follow chapters on the attitudes and actions of Catholics toward the Revolution, in the making of the Constitution, and on the advancing frontier. The treatment is often necessarily biographical since it was as individuals that Catholics expressed themselves. With the influx of immigrants, particularly the Irish, Catholics were to be found, again as individuals, on both sides of the ideological fence, with democratic partisans gradually outnumbering the surviving Federalist old guard. The final narrative chapters deal with the humanitarianism and the reforms of the first third of the nineteenth century, with a long sketch of the thought of Mathew Carey, who in spite of his prominence here was hardly motivated in his many crusades by religious zeal, an apparent characteristic of the many lay persons whose thought this book analyzes. It is in the treatment of this era of reform that the terminal date of the study, 1829, fails to justify itself, important as that year is in the historical development of the hierarchy in this country. Treatment of the abolition movement is admittedly inadequate, since that crusade "really got under way only after 1830." Of the peace movement of the period there is no mention. But the development of Catholic charities and schools was of great significance in that era and is ably summarized. Catholics found that they could not join temperance societies, dominated as these were by nativistic prejudices unfriendly to their church.

One of the excellences of this study is its willingness to present meagre findings. Its author is content to say that "American Catholics maintained a social outlook best described as conformist"—whether under the landed aristocracy of the seventeenth century or as adherents of "the democratic national faith which almost completely overwhelmed the older groups after the second War of Independence." Most Catholics "shared in the middle-class aspirations which were possible of attainment in the United States." But whichever side they took in the controversies of their day, "their opinions were squarely in line with other partisans and not uniquely Catholic in their premises," they were "almost exclusively individual in character" and they reflected "no comprehensive presentation of social principles drawn from the Scriptures, dogma, scholastic philosophy, and tradition." The unsystematic social and political theorizing in which these early American Catholics indulged usually had no reference to their religious beliefs and the democratic-minded even went so far as "to attempt the introduction into ecclesiastical affairs of the special political techniques of republican government." The author concludes with a statement of his belief that the Maryland tradition of religious liberty "became the principal cultural product of the Catholic body in America."

Bangor Theological Seminary, Bangor, Maine. C. Howard Hopkins.

THE RISE OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF NEW YORK, 1654-1860

By Hyman B. Grinstein. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1945. xiv, 645 pages. \$3.00.

The beginnings of Jewry in the United States date back almost 300 years. It was in 1655 that the Jewish community in New Amsterdam first received official recognition. Yet the history of the oldest Jewish community in the country has heretofore not received the attention which it deserves. While the story has been compiled of other historic Jewish communities, such as Philadelphia, Charleston, S. C., or Newport, R. I., only uncoordinated source material in the Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society and scattered special studies have been available for New York.

Dr. Grinstein's book is a serious and successful attempt to correct this deficiency. His work is based on a thorough collating of widely scattered material gathered not only from printed sources but also from the archives of the older Jewish congregations and from other unpublished sources. It presents and also analyses and interprets the historical facts which are here for the first time made available to the general reader. Two of the chapters, covering 100 pages, deal with the outgrowth of social and philanthropic activities from the synagogue, and with the development of the distinctive social, educational and cultural life of the Jewish community of the city. The rest of this substantial but eminently readable volume is devoted to the fissiparous development of the Synagogue in New York and its problems and religious practices. With the objectivity of the historian, Dr. Grinstein presents in true perspective such controversial matters as the rise of Reform Judaism, or the relations of Jews and Christians and Church and Synagogue. Ample and detailed notes give authority for all his statements, and a full index adds to the general serviceability of the volume. Dr. Grinstein has written an authoritative book, rich in curious historic lore and in interest to the specialist and to the general reader alike.

D. de Sola Pool.

A HISTORY OF THE DIOCESE OF ALBANY 1704-1923

By George E. DeMille. Philadelphia: The Church Historical Society, 1946. 151 pages. \$2.50.

This excellent and well-documented monograph covers the work of the Church of England and the Episcopal Church in the area surrounding Albany from the coming of the first Anglican minister to the consecration of the present Bishop of Albany. About half of the book is devoted to events preceding the organization of the diocese in 1868. To the general historian, this will probably be the more interesting half. Throughout the colonial period, Albany was one of the most strategic outposts of European

settlement, and the area around it included the important mission to the Mohawks, of which Mr. DeMille gives a full account, except for his failure to mention the fact that the work was begun by the Dutch ministers, before the arrival of the English. After the Revolution, the rapid settlement of the region gave the Episcopal Church one of its first experiences with the western work that was to be so significant a feature of nineteenth-century missionary history.

Such errors as have been noted are minor and concerned with matters lying beyond the immediate subject. The only one that seems to require mention is the author's slur upon "Puritan Christianity" for its neglect of Indian missions. No Protestant denomination, except the Moravian, can look with unmixed satisfaction on its record for Indian work in colonial times, but the New England Congregationalists did as much in this field as the Anglicans, and more than some other groups.

Specialized studies of this sort are of value chiefly to those interested in the particular subject, but, when they are as well done as this one, they merit the attention of the general student, also, for, by showing the local application of trends and movements with which more comprehensive works can only deal generally, they help us to understand the full historical effect of these developments.

New York City.

William Wilson Manross.

CONRAD WEISER, FRIEND OF COLONIST AND MOHAWK

By Paul A. W. Wallace. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945. 648 pages. \$5.00.

Written with freedom and grace from a fullness of knowledge derived from long familiarity with the scattered sources, this is a distinguished biography of a colorful figure in colonial Pennsylvania. Conrad Weiser was a pioneer settler, justice of the peace, and Indian interpreter who was a religious seeker among the German sects until his son-in-law, Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, presuaded him to return to the Lutheran faith of his fathers. Accordingly, apart from rich Indian lore and glimpses of colonial politics, this volume can also serve as a kind of introduction to the varieties of religious experience is eighteenth century Pennsylvania.

The flowing style of the book is punctuated by flashes of insight and humor. The territory involved in the Walking Purchase is called the "Forest of Penn and Ink." With reference to the failure of Zinzendorf's plan to unite religious bodies, the author observes that "the religious swamp had to be drained first into sectarian channels before its waters could be drawn into the sea of the Church Universal." But occasionally Professor Wallace allows his style to run away with his judgment, as when he implies that the burning of a copy of John Arndt's Garden of Paradise caused this work to be reprinted (60 f.), or when he asserts that Weiser was "the most prominent Lutheran layman of his time in America" (viii, 209), or when he dismisses John Caspar Stoever as a trouble maker (55f.). But such flourishes are occasional and in the nature of obiter dicta. The work as a whole, including its rich details, is informed, solid,

and balanced. While its appeal is most immediately to Pennsylvanians, no one who is interested in colonial history, secular or religious, should overlook this sturdy volume.

Theodore G. Tappert

THE CHRISTIAN FUTURE OR THE MODERN MIND OUTRUN

By Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. \$2.50.

The starting point of this attempt to "recast the Christian truth" is the experience of the two world wars and of the veritable end of the "old world" with all its implications for the "new world." The old order has destroyed itself and, therefore, none of the pre-war institutions, neither State nor Church, can rebuild the Western world. Christianity is bankrupt but it is not refuted, and the task is to reinterpret its central dogmas of death and life, of cross and resurrection in terms intelligible to the modern mind.

The book has three parts. The introductory criticism of "Interim America" from 1890-1940, of its suburbs, factories and philosophies of adjustment is in spite of the author's journalistic "Life"-style illuminating and incisive. It shows the impossibility of "running a nation by factories and education." The closing chapters on "The Body of our Era" are an ambitious specimen of the modern mind which revels as a "camping mind" in speculations about general and church history, economics and the alleged "Penetration of the Cross" into the worlds of Buddha, Laotse and Abraham, advocating a new era of faith where the social sciences shall be "The Old Testament" of our time. The central part "When Time is out of Joint" is the most substantial and consistent one, rich with profound insights, brilliant formulations and extravagant statements like these, that the history of man since Christ has been "the application of the Athanasian Creed to everyday life" or that when Lincoln walked without any escort into Richmond "St. Francis had conquered the powers of this earth," or that the war against Hitler was a "religious war." The serious main thesis, however, is that the structure and dynamic of Western history is rooted in the Christian faith toward the realization of a Future which is more than an extension of the present and past. Western progress into the future has been achieved time and again not by a mechanical and linear progress but by revolutions and conversions, through death and rebirth, the pattern of which is the acceptance of the Cross and the faith in Resurrection. "Christianity is the embodiment of one single truth: that death precedes birth, that birth is the fruit of death, and that the soul is precisely this power of transforming an end into a beginning." The pagan natural man begins with birth and lives forward toward death, the Christian lives from the end of life back into a new beginning. He emerges from the grave of his old self into the openness of a real future. Thus the future of Christianity depends on the innermost futurism of the Christian faith as such which anticipates a goal and end of this world. As a promise of life Christianity created the open horizon of an ever renewable future over against the cyclic scheme of the classical pagan view of the world. "Christianity and Future are synonymous." The central chapter on "The Creation of Future" starts therefore with the statement that a question about "the future of Christianity" would be out of order be-

cause Christianity itself is the only trustee of the future.

It is obvious, nevertheless, that Rosenstock's real concern throughout his book is the future of our Western (Christian) culture and the creation of new communities, but not the original crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the imitation of his life. Likewise his concept of history as a history of judgment and salvation is entirely secularized. To him the disintegration of Europe is sufficient to warrant "the end of the world" and "the last judgment" is passed on "Proust's France, Rasputin's Russia, Wilhelm II's Germany and President Harding's America.' the creative aspect of faith is reduced to such natural and pagan "creations' as planting a tree, winning a battle and begetting a child. Thus the theological notions of the cross, last judgment and resurrection are subservient to a philosophy of life which confuses its own "creative" designs and ambitions with the transforming power of faith in Jesus Christ (which does not at all "depend" on our "creation of future"), and the missionary zeal of apostles with the eagerness of would-be reformers, without ever discussing the profound ambiguity and perversion to which the Christian faith has become subjected by its very success in the secular history of the Western world. A further instance of this secularization and evaporation is Rosenstock's own attempt to adjust the Christian truth to the modern mind. For the "crucial" life as understood by him is as much and as little inspired by the Spirit of Christianity as the progress of natural sciences and all our modern futurism are inspired by the pilgrim's progress toward salvation. The metaphorical use of the words cross and "crucial" or resurrection and "renewal" does not recast the Christian truth but only elaborates the Stirb und Werde of Goethe who was as much of a pagan as of a Christian. It would, however, be worth while to separate in Professor Rosenstock's book those pages which are profound and substantial from those which are merely challenging and "stimulating."

Occasionally the author drops a derogatory remark about G. Santayana as an academic observer, standing outside the agony of history. One may wonder if Professor Rosenstock-Huessy's brilliant mind should not rather have profited by the serene detachment and intellectual discipline of a Santayana instead of attacking his reader (whom he assumes to be indolent, and therefore in need of a stimulant) with so many half-truths which are worse than a full error because they conceal the falsehoods of

fragments of truth.

Hartford Theological Seminary

Karl Löwith.

ADVANCE THROUGH STORM: A.D. 1914 AND AFTER WITH CONCLUDING GENERALIZATIONS

By Kenneth Scott Latourette. Vol. VII of A History of the Expansion of Christianity. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1945. xiii, 542 pages, maps. \$4.00.

This crowning volume of Professor Latourette's great and beneficent

history, by this time so well-known, is no less timely than when it was published in 1945. Its account of the progress of Christianity in years of "storm" was encouraging near the end of World War II. In the present time, darker than in the last months of the war, this solid record of what was gained when many thought gain impossible continues to give stability

and uphold confidence.

The book falls into two distinct parts. Much the larger covers the thirty years from 1914. Three chapters are final to the whole seven volumes. On 1914-1944 the author follows his familiar pattern of political and social movements forming the environment of Christianity, the processes of its spread, detailed study of fields, the reciprocal effect of the religion and the environment. The dominant note, with some qualifications, is "advance". Since this has been and will be challenged, it is relevant to note that the historical qualities which readers of the preceding volumes know well, thorough knowledge based on enormous reading, cautious weighing of evidence, sympathetic understanding but objectivity, are conspicuous here. This is contemporary history, but history, not propaganda. Regarding Europe there is an admirable condensed recital, balancing the view by bringing to memory things forgotten in the crowded years. Particularly valuable are the Russian and German portions. Losses are forcibly stated, and the religious catastrophe is faced. Yet the total judgment, supported by specific reasons, is that "In some respects... Christianity was stronger in 1945 than it had been in 1914 and was more of a force in the life of Europe." The chapter on the United States concludes that "Whether Christianity was more or less a factor in American life than in 1914 would be impossible to determine with accuracy", in a time so brief and a life so complicated. The author studies the rapid increase of church membership, faster than the growth of population, Protestant somewhat more than Roman Catholic, and thinks that "something like a mass conversion of the United States was in progress". Quality and influence did not altogether correspond to quantity. Christianity "had met serious challenges, sometimes without an appreciation of their importance and unsuccessfully, sometimes with only indifferent success, but on occasion with marked achievement". "Its very ability to adjust itself to the changing times was an evidence of vigor." Emphasis is laid on the acceleration of "the movement toward cooperation, union and the interpenetration of almost all bodies by others" and on the leadership of American Christians and churches in the ecumenical movement.

There follow chapters on the rest of the world: British, Danish and Dutch territories in the Americas, Latin America, the Pacific lands, Africa south of the Sahara, northern Africa and the Near East, India, southeastern Asia, China, and the Japanese empire, or the lands that once composed it. For northern Africa and the Near East the report is that "the outlook was somber for a Christianity which was not well rooted in the soil". For all these other regions, comprising the larger part of the world and its population, advance is recorded, notably in the long crowded chapters on China, India and southern Africa, where there has been signal progress every way.

The conclusion of a chapter reviewing the thirty years is that whereas from their events it might have been expected that Christianity would be at their end "a receding force"-events most vividly stated in a later paragraph on p. 462-in 1944 it was "a more potent factor in the total worldscene than it had been in 1914. Measured by the criteria of geographic extent, vigor as evidenced by new movements, and effect upon mankind as a whole, Christianity had not lost but gained". It "was better rooted in a larger number of peoples". Indigenous leadership had developed strongly, and local financial support; "the missionary era was passing". Again, "For the first time in its history Christianity was becoming really world-wide", and not an "extension . . . of an occidental faith". Yet again, "the Christians of the world were achieving a conscious world-fellowship"; "the movement was most striking among Protestantism", "in ways quite new in Christian history". The expansion of Christianity was through Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, the Eastern churches having lost ground. While the Roman Catholic Church was "increasing its relative share", "the spread of Christianity was still being achieved more through Protestantism". A feature of these thirty years which evidently deeply impresses Professor Latourette is that "More than at any time since the first three centuries, Christians" of all kinds "were tending to be self-conscious minorities set in an alien and hostile world". Yet "Christians had not given over the idea of transforming the entire world", especially in Anglo-Saxon Protestantism, and partly because of this "Christianity was more widely influential in the post-1914 decades than ever before".

The three final chapters are equal in weight if not in bulk to the first part, and form a worthy ending to a history of high enduring worth. A review can only indicate some of the important content of which they are compact. The first is a memorable piece of work, a summary in fifty pages of the whole history of the expansion of Christianity, extraordinary for its combination of broad views with facts that give them vividness and convincing power. The conclusion is: "As, in A.D. 1944, the historian looked back, . . . he was conscious that as by successive pulses of a great tide the faith had gained in the affairs of men . . . each major forward wave had carried the faith into traditional portions of the earth's surface. Each recession had been less marked than its predecessor. . . . Especially after A.D. 1815 it had been planted among practically all peoples, and after A.D. 1914 was becoming firmly rooted"; "no other religion had had a similar record". These words lead on to a chapter which compares Christianity with other religions, only as regards "the historical record of spread, of decline and of interaction with the environment". From this point of view are studied Islam, Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism. From only one of these, Confucianism, has Christianity made many converts; its growth has been "chiefly at the expense of polytheism and animism". "In 1944 . . . Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, while long comparatively static, were substantially intact". But the judgment after pages showing profound knowledge of the history of these four is that "in the record of its expansion and of its effect upon mankind Christianity . . . was unique", the tests being geographical spread, survival of "the death of cultures with which it had been intimately associated", "power of inward renewal and of moulding new cultures", continuing increase to greatest strength at the latest time, power for intellectual advance, moral reform, spiritual regeneration. The author says more than once that it seems clear that the Christianity which has this record of advance is only at the beginning of its history. Another thing seems clear to him, that further advance will not be "by absorbing the other religions, and making from them a new synthesis" because—this also is said more than once—the form of Christianity which has had power of propagation has "always held to the uniqueness of Jesus Christ and . . . insisted that through him God had supremely revealed Himself and

wrought for the redemption and transformation of man".

The last chapter is another summary, this time of "inclusive answers" applying to the questions about Christianity, aside from geographical expansion, which have been raised at every point of the narrative, answers full of instruction and inspiration. In his closing pages Professor Latourette looks forward, on the basis of history. Here, he affirms, faith enters, but the facts stand to uphold and enlighten faith. The book ends with a noble declaration of faith that the purpose of God for man revealed in the risen Christ "will not be defeated". As for the historical future, it is thought that if Christianity is to become "the professed faith of all mankind", this will be "only after a vast reach of time"; and even so, "the Christian ideal and the historical process are each such that perfection, as the Christian judges perfection, will not be attained within time". Yet "here is no futility within history", for in the light of the record "the outlook was bright for Christianity" and its transforming influence.

Union Theological Seminary, New York. Robert Hastings Nichols

THE UNITED STATES MOVES ACROSS THE PACIFIC

By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946. 174 pages. \$2.00.

That the United States has moved across the Pacific much as it moved across the western plains and that it is deeply involved in Far Eastern affairs for a long time to come is the main thesis of this book. It is not a history of the Far East. Professor Latourette has done that elsewhere this year. Indeed this book presupposes on the part of the reader a fair knowledge of modern international relations in the Orient. In his able way the author first describes the "Far-Eastward Drive" of our country, then pauses to interpret the nations and peoples with which we shall have (increasingly, probably) to deal, and concludes with a chapter on our policy in the immediate future. But Professor Latourette recognizes, also, that in addition to relationships between nations there exist world-wide movements and factors such as communism, nationalism, industrialiam, science, democracy, and the Christian Church, which are helping to shape the destiny of the oriental countries.

This review is being written on the day following the proclamation of Philippine independence. We have every right to be proud of this achievement of the Philippine people. But let no one imagine that we are pulling out of the Pacific. We are in Japan; we are in China. What happens in India, Burma, and Java concerns us. We shall be playing our part only as we accept our full share of responsibility with other nations to guide humanity into the ways of peace and greater security than now it enjoys.

What Professor Latourette says needs saying, and in some reactionary, conservative sections of our nation, many of his vibrant sentences should be cried from the housetops as warning that only to our own hurt can we disavow our obligations. China will need our material help and moral support for years. A wise policy in Japan (and for the most part it has been remarkably judicious and exemplary) will clear the way for an early rapprochement of the two recent enemy nations. As the author puts it: "clearly hopes must be held out to the Japanese for readmission to the family of nations on the basis of full legal equality with other powers' (146). And back of all international arrangements and policies stands the Christian Church which now has an unprecedented opportunity throughout the Far East.

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Mervin M. Deems.

MEN WHO HAVE WALKED WITH GOD

By Sheldon Cheney. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. 395 pages. \$3.75.

Selected mystics (Lao-Tse, Buddha, Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Saint Bernard, Meister Eckhart, Fra Angelico, Boehme, Brother Lawrence, and William Blake) are presented to illustrate the historical reality and spiritual validity of mystical experience. Their story is told well, at times brilliantly. In many ways the account offers excellent reference material, and it fulfills the intention of the author as he enters the battle for spirituality against rationalism and materialism. His knowledge and understanding of art raise the chapters on Fra Angelico and William Blake to outstanding description, and it is refreshing to follow the intuitive and well-expressed evaluation of an art critic venturing into a philosophical and theological field. Had the book remained a series of unrelated accounts, it would have filled a good need for a fervent, though uncritical, testimony for mystical experience.

Unfortunately, the author attempts historical and philosophical criticism, and in this shows serious shortcomings. He jumps at conclusions, treats conjectures as facts, evaluates on the basis of one-sided presentations, and attempts a genetic account with arbitrarily chosen material. He justly decries logical and philosophical evaluation of spiritual experience, yet he categorizes and evaluates without establishing adequate criteria. Theologically, he assumes the position that real union with God comes only through mystical experience. Union with God through faith and in the sacraments is largely ignored. In many respects the book is quite amateurish. Criticism of an account of mystical experience on the basis of methods and criteria is entered into reluctantly, but it is necessary when the author himself uses methods and criteria. Denunciation of theology cannot escape the use of theology. Yet faults and shortcomings are forgiven and almost forgotten for the intuitive and inspiring accounts of Fra Angelico and William Blake.

Johannes Knudsen.